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Abstract 
In the first chapter I study regional growth and sub-national income convergence 
in India in the context of economic reforms that were undertaken since 1991. I also 
examine convergence in development inputs such as population growth, literacy and 
investment at the sub-national level. My results show that there is a strong evidence of 
divergence in per capita income of the 15 states studied in the sample. The standard 
deviation of net state domestic product has increased over time indicating no evidence of 
convergence in the pre- or post-reforms period. Population, state capital expenditure and 
commercial bank credit have also diverged over time across these 15 Indian states. 
However, literacy shows evidence of convergence across states. 
In the second chapter I study sectoral output patterns and growth across states in 
India during pre- and post economic reforms period (1970-1990 and 1991-2005). I also 
study the relationship between per capita income and the shares of primary, secondary, 
and tertiary sectors in the total output. The data shows that the growth of secondary sector 
has stagnated in India. Thus there was an increase of just 1.45 percent in the secondary 
sector mean share in total output during post-reform period. The primary sector‟s share in 
the total output has declined with increasing per capita income conforming the theoretical 
prediction. As far as the tertiary sector is concerned, it has experienced rapid growth over 
the sample period. However, employment growth in the tertiary sector has been very 
slow. I have also investigated for the effect of increasing per capita income and other 
development inputs like investment, population and literacy rate on the changes in 
sectoral shares. I find literacy rates and state capital expenditure to be positively and 
significantly linked to the increase in tertiary sector output.  
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In the third chapter I study the relationship between socio-political violence and 
economic growth across 16 states in India. I find that in India at large riots do not have a 
significant effect on NSDP growth. In spite of the various socio-political disturbances in 
terms of caste, language and ethnic issues, India has continued to develop economically. 
The episodes of socio-political problems and related violence do not seem to have put a 
drag on India‟s fast pace of economic growth. However, I find that in case of seven states 
that are affected with Maoist/Naxalite violence, riots have a significant growth-inhibiting 
effect. 
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1 Income convergence and regional growth in India: Before and after the 
economic liberalization 
1.1 Introduction 
In recent years India has shown a dramatic improvement on the economic scene. It 
has become one of the world‟s fastest growing economies with average growth rates of 
nine percent over the past four years (World Bank 2009). This is in stark contrast to the 
post independence decade growth rate of about 3.5 percent per year and 5-6 percent 
average rate of growth which prevailed in the 1980s (Economic survey 2008). Looking at 
the fast pace of growth in the 2000s, media and scholars have dubbed India as „Asia‟s 
other powerhouse,‟ „newest Asian tiger‟ and so on. India is also the world‟s second most 
populated country with a population that is both growing and young. This is a vital 
dimension of India as a player in the world markets as an investor, consumer and 
producer.
1
 Being a democratic country, India‟s recent turnaround in growth is also 
important from the point of view of development and democracy nexus.  
The role of comprehensive economic reforms undertaken in 1991 in this 
unprecedented growth boost and transformation of India‟s image has sparked a lot of 
discussion in the development literature, especially about whether this fast economic 
growth can be attributed to the liberalization in 1991 (Panagaria 2004; Ahluwalia 2000; 
Kumar 2000; Joshi and Little 1996). Apart from this debate, it is important to note that a 
high rate of economic growth at the national level need not necessarily mean that all the 
states enjoyed equal benefits of this growth spurt. Besides the effect on the national 
                                                 
1
 As an example of India‟s role in world markets, Robert Zoellick (President of the World 
Bank) recently said that „India‟s strong crisis management and sustained global demand 
from the 1.2-trillion-dollar economy was playing an important role in helping the world 
recover from the global economic crisis‟ (The Hindu 2009). 
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economic growth, economic reforms also have significant implications for the regional 
distribution of growth in India.  
In this paper I study the regional growth patterns and income convergence in the 
context of economic reforms. Understanding the regional differences after economic 
liberalization has important implications for continuation of these reforms and the 
development of second generation reforms.
2
 To examine if states in India experienced 
income convergence both before and after the reforms, I analyze economic growth across 
15 Indian states for the pre-liberalization period (1970-1990) and post liberalization 
period (1991-2005). I test for sigma convergence in output (income).
3
 For any 
explanation of divergence or convergence of output, it is also important to test for 
convergence in some determinants of the steady state.
4
 Hence I investigate sigma 
convergence of input variables such as human capital, investment and population.  
My results show that there is a strong evidence of divergence in the per capita 
income of the 15 states in the sample. The standard deviation of net state domestic 
product has increased over time. This indicates that there is no evidence of sub-national 
convergence in the pre- or post-reforms period in Indian states. Population, state capital 
expenditure and commercial bank credit also have diverged over time across these 15 
states. However, literacy shows evidence of convergence across states. 
                                                 
2
 As mentioned by Kar and Saktivel (2007:69), the study of trends in regional disparity in 
the context of reforms has „serious ramifications for the continuation of the reform 
processes‟. 
3
 Sigma convergence refers to a decrease in dispersion of income in a group of 
economies. One important implication of the neoclassical growth model is output 
(income) convergence between regions. If states have similar population growth, savings, 
and technology, the output or income across countries will tend to converge to a common 
steady state. 
4
 See Grier and Grier (2007). 
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My paper is novel in the following ways. First, as mentioned above, in addition to 
studying convergence in output across states, I also study convergence in inputs like 
population growth, literacy and investment to see whether there has been a convergence 
in these development inputs across states over time. Second, I break the period under 
study into pre-liberalization and post-liberalization years. This will help in understanding 
the differences and/or similarities in growth processes in states across the two periods.  
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section I discuss the economic 
policies that prevailed in the pre-reform years, the circumstances that led to the 1991 
economic reforms, and the reform policies in detail. In section 1.3, I explain why it is 
important to study growth at the state level. Section 1.4 presents the state level growth 
experience in the context of per capita net state domestic product in the pre- and post-
liberalization periods. Later in section 1.5, I review articles on income convergence in 
India at the sub-national level. In section 1.6, I discuss the convergence hypothesis. In 
section 1.7, I discuss data, methodology, and test for convergence.  Section 1.8 
summarizes the results. I present descriptive evidence of impact of economic reforms in 
some states in section 1.9. Section 1.10 concludes. 
1.2 Liberalization in India 
1.2.1 The pre-reform years: Post independence economic policies 
For any discussion of the economic liberalization in India, one has to first 
understand the post independence economy and structure of the Indian economy. 
Therefore a good starting point is the explanation of economic policies and political 
thought processes in the post independence era. India achieved its independence from the 
British in 1947. Recovering from the scars of colonial rule, India‟s post independence 
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economic policy was to focus on self reliance. The Congress government followed an 
inward looking economic policy based on central economic planning. India‟s outlook 
towards economic policy was to some extent consistent with the Harrod- Domar model, 
which emphasized capital accumulation for achieving economic growth. Thus India 
followed a „mixed economy‟ which featured state controlled capitalism. An analysis of 
the above mentioned post independence Indian economic history until the 1980s suggests 
that, for almost 35 years after independence, India had economic policies that were based 
on socialist ideology. This meant that before any private industrial effort could be 
undertaken, one needed the permission of the state. This led to the emergence of the 
„License Raj‟ which meant that before setting up any entrepreneurial initiative, one had to 
go through a lengthy process of procuring a license and had to face numerous regulations. 
In addition to these licensing processes, the imports of raw materials and capital goods 
were restricted. There were multiple excise duties on goods, and the public sector had 
monopolies in services like banking, airlines, and electric power. The sectors that were 
open for private investment were limited. 
In the late 1980s, India took the first steps in the direction of economic reform 
under the government of Rajiv Gandhi. Since there was still a dominance of the socialist 
mindset on the political front, these reforms were introduced slowly. In fact, the phrase 
„liberalization by stealth‟ is often used to depict this generation of reforms.  The 
government eliminated some regulations and restrictions on private sector industries. The 
so-called „License Raj‟ was starting to be dismantled. One of the important decisions was 
modifications in the Monopolies Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) act. MRTP, which 
came into existence in 1969, was put in place to “prevent private monopolies and 
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concentration of economic power” (Dandekar 2004). However, the regulations and 
controls associated with this act led to increased bureaucracy and inhibited growth of 
private industry (Dandekar 2004). Some provisions of this act limited the expansion of 
existing private industries and new investments that could take place. As a part of the 
reforms, some industries were granted exemption from the MRTP altogether which 
provided a boost to the private industry. There were also changes in fiscal policies to 
reduce the taxes on inputs. These tax reforms helped reduce the price distortions that 
were rampant. All these policy initiatives raised domestic industries‟ morale and created 
an environment conducive to development. There was also a modernization of the 
telecommunications industry and transfer of technology in these areas from foreign 
countries.  
However, these reforms were implemented at a slow pace and did not constitute a 
comprehensive economic liberalization. A stronghold of leftist ideologies still existed in 
Indian politics which did not support opening up the entire economy. Towards the end of 
the 1980s, India faced significant political instability, which affected the pace of reform. 
It was only in 1991 that a more comprehensive economic liberalization was undertaken 
due to circumstances discussed below.  
1.2.2 Comprehensive and systematic economic liberalization in 1991  
In 1991, economic liberalization was officially undertaken in response to the 
balance of payments crisis that India faced at the time. It was an important and definitive 
step toward having a more open economy, indicating a shift from the socialist thinking of 
the Congress government which prevailed until the mid-1980s. These economic reforms 
included changes in industrial, fiscal, external sector and financial sector policies. 
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Following its devaluation, the Indian Rupee became fully convertible on the current 
account. Foreign direct investment and technology transfers were encouraged, and Indian 
industries were allowed to access international capital markets.  
The most important reason for reforms was the worsening of the balance of 
payments. In 1991, India only had enough foreign exchange to support two weeks of 
imports. The fiscal deficit was mounting, and there was high inflation. This was the worst 
liquidity crisis that India had faced. There were many factors responsible for this. In 
1990, the Gulf War started after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. This affected the oil 
trade that India had with the Gulf countries. The price of oil rose, and paying for oil 
imports became more and more expensive for India. Also, the remittances from Indians 
residing in Gulf countries nearly stopped, and money that India earned through exports to 
the Gulf dwindled (Kumar 2000).  
In addition to the above mentioned problems, there was a lot of political 
uncertainty. After the defeat of Rajiv Gandhi in the 1989 general elections, two short-
lived governments came into power, each ruling for less than a year. This political 
instability lowered India‟s credit rating in both short-term and long-term credit markets. 
With this loss of confidence in the Indian economy, it became very difficult to borrow in 
the international market. In addition to this, Non-Resident Indians (NRIs), started 
withdrawing money that they had invested in India, creating capital flight.
5
 This almost 
                                                 
5
 The State Bank of India, www.sbi.com defines „a Non Resident Indian (NRI), as “an 
Indian citizen or foreign national of Indian origin residing outside of India for purposes of 
employment, carrying on business or vocation in circumstances as would indicate an 
intention to stay outside India for an indefinite period. An individual will also be 
considered NRI if his stay in India is less than 182 days during the preceding financial 
year.”  
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default-like situation in the external account was countered through borrowing from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) under the provision of standby arrangements. The 
1991 crisis drove India towards a policy change. 
As mentioned earlier, trade liberalization had started in India in the late 1980s. 
But a more comprehensive set of reforms was only implemented in 1991. Therefore, 
there is a lot of debate in the literature about whether to consider the reforms undertaken 
in 1985-86 as an indicator of economic policy shift or whether the 1991-92 measures be 
deemed as policy shift. An examination of these counterarguments is beyond the scope of 
this paper. I have treated the 1991 economic reforms as an indication of policy shift since 
these were more far reaching and all-embracing in nature than the earlier generation of 
reforms.  
1.2.3 Post-reform scenario: what policies characterized 1991 reforms? 
In spite of some efforts in the late 1980s, the quantitative restrictions on imports 
were still very binding. As Virmani (2003) mentions, the duty-free input imports in 
particular had a lot of restrictions. In 1991, import licenses on almost all the intermediate 
and capital goods were dismantled. The government introduced Special Import Licenses 
(SIL), which could be used for importing restricted items as way of promoting exports. 
Exporters were allowed to obtain SILs proportional to their export trading volume. That 
is, import concessions were tied to export excellence for some commodities. Profits 
earned from exports became 100 percent tax free. The export promotion zones were 
given an additional incentive of a tax holiday for 5 to 8 years. Import licensing was 
abolished in 2001 after the dispute between India and its trade partners in the WTO. Now 
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only a few canalized
6
 and environmentally sensitive goods need import licensing. All the 
quantitative restrictions on imports from member countries of the South Asian 
Association for Regional cooperation, SAARC, were given up unilaterally in 1998 by 
India (Virmani 2003).  
As far as tariff rates are concerned, the Indian economy faced very high tariffs in 
the 1980s, partly for protectionist arguments and partly for revenue reasons. In 1990-91, 
the highest tariff rate was 355 percent. This was brought down to 50.8 percent in 1998-99 
(Kumar 2000). Tariff rates on capital goods, among others, were brought down from 35 
percent to 25 percent in 1994-95. While India may still have very high tariff rates when 
compared to other Asian countries, there has nonetheless been a spectacular decrease 
relative to the pre-reform tariffs in India.  
There was also a conscious effort to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) 
to India. FDI can be a very significant factor in accelerating industrialization in 
developing countries. FDI, along with financial flows, brings modern technology, skill 
levels and even market access.
7
 The government declared the New Industrial Policy in 
1991, which liberalized rules about FDI. This new policy allowed for an „automatic 
approval‟ or an „automatic route‟ for FDI in 34 priority industries. Automatic route 
means that in these sectors, investment can be made without approval of the central 
government. Only the regional office of the Reserve Bank of India needs to be notified. 
                                                 
6
 The government has a monopoly in importing these items. 
7
 The extent to which foreign direct investment (FDI) can provide a stimulus to economic 
growth and development is a widely debated question. There are many empirical papers 
that study the relationship between FDI and economic growth and find mixed results 
(Carkovic and Levine 2005; Borensztein, Gregorio
 
and Lee
 
1998). FDI by itself, may not 
boost economic growth that is independent of other factors. 
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After the approval for FDI by the automatic route, FDI can take place after getting the 
necessary regulatory approvals at the state and local level. Up to 51 percent foreign 
equity was allowed in 35 priority industries. For some of the infrastructure industries, this 
could be up to 71 percent. In the sector of ports and roads development, up to 100 percent 
foreign ownership was permitted by the end of the 1990s. Non-resident Indians were 
allowed 100 percent ownership even in priority industries (Kumar 2000; Virmani 2003; 
Panagariya 2004). 
The government also established the Foreign Investment Promotion Board 
(FIPB), which aims to promote FDI in India through undertaking activities in India and 
abroad. The FIPB facilitates investment in India through non-resident Indians, 
international companies and various foreign investors. FIPB approves all other 
investment cases which do not fall under the purview of automatic approval. There is a 
limit of 4-6 weeks on the processing time of these applications by FIPB. According to the 
FIPB, if the foreign investor wants to hold less than the entire equity of the company, 
there is no need for a local partner. The rest of the equity can be offered to the general 
public (FIPB 2007). 
 As is clear from the above discussion, India made a serious and much more 
comprehensive effort of opening up its external sector in 1991
8
.  
1.3 Why is a study at the regional/state level important? 
As can be gleamed from the above discussion, the economic liberalization 
undertaken in 1991 reduced the extent of control by the central government in many 
                                                 
8
 On the domestic front there was also an effort towards disinvestment of government 
ownership in public sector corporations. A commission on disinvestment was set up for 
recommending the phases of this disinvestment. 
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areas. Specifically, decentralization in areas related to investment led to a higher scope 
for initiative on the part of state and local governments. With less central government 
control and intervention, the states had the freedom to frame policies to attract foreign as 
well as domestic investment. Therefore it is important to study the patterns in economic 
growth before, and after, liberalization was undertaken. Besides looking at the national 
economic growth, it is important to compare the economic performance at the sub-
national level. A study aimed only at the national level can mask the dynamics at the state 
level. Finding out whether all states enjoyed the same rate of economic growth or only 
the richer states continued to grow faster will have important policy implications for a 
balanced regional growth objective. Analyzing the differences, and/or similarities 
between economic performances of various states would shed light on the distribution of 
high economic growth experienced in the post-liberalization period.  
Another reason a regional level study is interesting is the structure of Indian 
government and the relations between the central and state governments. As far as the tax 
raising powers of the state and center are concerned, the Indian Constitution gives most 
powers to the central government, which leads to an imbalance as far as the sources of 
tax revenue for the states are concerned (Cashin and Sahay 2000). However, to ensure 
balanced regional growth, the constitution also has made provisions for the transfer of 
grants from the center to the states in three forms: statutory transfers (like tax sharing), 
grants in aid, and plan and discretionary grants (usually given to support central 
government projects). Study of the allocation of funds shows that poorer states have 
indeed received a relatively higher proportion of funds than the richer states (Ghosh 
2007). For states like Bihar, which has very low economic and social development, the 
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transfers of funds from the central government form a major source of state income (Luce 
2004). Studying whether the regional inequalities have declined over time, and whether 
the poorer states have been able to catch up with the richer ones will be able to indirectly 
shed some light on the impact of such fund transfers to state governments. I will analyze 
the growth experience at the state level in the next section.  
1.4 State level growth experience in the pre- and post-liberalization period 
A brief look at the state domestic product‟s growth rates of various states in India 
indicates significant regional disparities. The Indian states are characterized by very 
different socio-economic conditions. This is true for indicators of economic well-being 
such as the growth of state domestic product as well as various measures of social well 
being such as the demographic indices. The growth experience at the aggregate level 
masks a lot of what is happening at the sub-national level. Aiyyar (2000) notes that the 
sub-national dispersion of per capita income and urbanization in India is greater than that 
found in relatively homogeneous groups of countries like those in the European Union. 
While emphasizing the geography of development, Bhandari and Khare (2002) point out 
that, on average, the western parts of India have grown faster than the eastern parts of 
India.  
In this section I present some observations about NSDP growth in 15 states in the 
pre- and post-reform periods. Table 1.2 and Figure 1.1 give the average annual growth 
rates for 15 states in the pre-reform and post-reform years. At the aggregate level, the 
average annual growth rate of these 15 states, increased from 2.03 percent before reforms 
to 2.21 percent in the post-reform period.  
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Some states, like Tamilnadu, Kerala, and Maharashtra, grew faster in the post-
reform period compared to states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Assam. Of the 15 states in 
my sample, nine states show acceleration in growth after reforms. Kerala and West 
Bengal, which initially were middle income states, grew very rapidly after 1991.  These 
two states, in spite of having lower growth in the pre reform period, show high growth 
rates in the post-reform years. Kerala‟s result is especially interesting because Kerala‟s 
„development paradox‟ is often talked about in the socio-economic literature. Kerala has 
achieved high development in literacy, life expectancy and other indicators of human 
development.  For example, the literacy rate in Kerala is almost 91 percent. In spite of 
this, its economic performance in decades prior to the reforms was not good. However, in 
the post-reform decades Kerala actually grew faster than most of the other states, from 
NSDP of Rs. 6,992 in 1991 to almost Rs. 23,199 in 2005.
9
 Likewise Andhra Pradesh 
almost tripled its per capita NSDP, going from Rs. 6,886 in 1970 to Rs. 19,858 in 2005. 
For initially rich states like Maharashtra and Gujarat, economic growth continued in the 
post-reform period. 
Now turning to some poor states, in 2005-2006, the net state domestic product for 
Bihar was only Rs. 5129. If we consider the evolution of state domestic product per 
capita in various states over the period of 1970-2006, we see that Bihar stagnated around 
the income of Rs. 4746 for almost a decade, picking up only in late 1980s, and again 
falling in the post-reform period to reach only Rs. 5129 in 2005. Uttar Pradesh also could 
not accelerate pace of growth in the post-reform period. However, the two initially low 
                                                 
9
 Kerala‟s better performance in NSDP per capita can in part be attributed to the low 
growth rate of population in the state and high growth of its service industry.  
 
 13 
 
income states of Madhya Pradesh and Orissa show marked improvement in their 
performance. This diversity makes understanding the pattern and transition of economic 
growth across states of fundamental interest. In the next section I present a review of 
some papers that discuss regional convergence in India. 
1.5 Sub-national convergence in India  
The literature on testing for income convergence across Indian states is relatively 
recent.
10
 There have been various studies on economic growth and productivity in India, 
both at the national and regional levels, but the empirical study of income convergence 
began only in the mid 1990s.  Starting with a 1995 study done by Cashin and Sahay, 
there has been a range of analytical studies on sub-national income convergence. Many of 
these theoretically model and empirically test for absolute and conditional beta 
convergence as well as sigma convergence of income. The empirical papers test for and 
explain the differences across Indian states in per capita income and other human 
development indicators using variables like inter-state migration, investment, transfer of 
funds from the central government to the state governments, and infrastructure.  
However, there does not seem to be a consensus among researchers on whether or not 
there is income convergence across Indian states. Various papers reach diverse 
conclusions using a range of differing samples, methods, and explanatory variables. I 
review several of the most prominent studies below and provide a more extensive list in 
Table 1.1. 
                                                 
10
 India has 28 states and 7 union territories. Union territories are areas which do not have 
a separate state government and are administered directly by the central government. 
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As mentioned above, Cashin and Sahay (1995) were the first to empirically test 
for sub- national convergence in India. They use data for 20 states for the period 1961-91 
to test the Solow-Swan neo-classical growth model and find strong evidence of absolute 
convergence. Specifically, they show that the states that were initially poor in their 
sample grew faster than the states that were initially rich. They theorize that interstate 
migration and grant transfers from the central government to state governments could be 
the main sources of cross state equalization of incomes. Resources transferred in the form 
of tax sharing, grants in aid, plan grants, loans, or allocation of credit may have reduced 
interstate disparities in income. While migration from poor states to richer states and 
grant transfers from richer to poorer states are good potential reasons for income 
convergence, their data shows only weak evidence for such migration and grant transfers. 
Nagaraj et al. (2000) use a dynamic panel to study the period from 1970 to 1994 
for 17 states.  Unlike the previous paper, the authors explain growth differences across 
states at least in part by differences in infrastructure development.  The authors construct 
an aggregate infrastructure variable using principal components analysis and show that 
the role of public expenditure on infrastructure is an important determinant of the 
conditional convergence in their sample. Aiyyar (2001), however, in a study of 19 Indian 
states over the period 1971-1996 finds strong evidence of absolute divergence. However, 
when he controls for factors like the literacy rate and private capital formation, the data 
shows support for conditional convergence. 
Unlike the papers discussed above, Das (2002) studies agricultural wages for 14 
Indian states from 1956 to 1993 and finds evidence of absolute convergence in wages. 
Later he goes on to classify the states in his sample into high, middle, and low income 
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categories and tests for convergence within these groups. Here again he finds evidence of 
absolute income convergence, with the rate of convergence being the fastest in the group 
of the poorest states. 
Adabar (2004) extends the period under study by including the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. With data on 14 states for 1976-2001, the author uses dynamic fixed effects 
estimation and also finds support for absolute and conditional convergence in per capita 
income. The rate at which the poorer states caught up with the incomes of richer states is 
about 12 percent per five year time period. The author shows that population growth, 
credit extended by commercial banks and capital expenditures by state governments are 
significant factors in explaining this convergence. 
Most recently, Nayyar (2008) studies 16 Indian states for the period 1978-2003 
using Generalized Method of Moments estimation. Like Aiyyar (2001), the author finds 
no evidence of absolute convergence. States do not seem to converge to the same steady 
state. Nevertheless, once variables like literacy rate, investment, and infant mortality are 
taken into account, the author does find evidence of conditional convergence. In sum, it is 
clear from the above discussion, that there is no clear cut conclusion about income 
convergence in India. The findings about convergence vary depending on the explanatory 
variables considered, the period under study, and the states in the sample.  
1.6 Income growth in state economies - convergence or divergence? 
            As can be seen from the above discussion, the most common starting point for a 
regional growth analysis of India has been the neo-classical growth model (NGM) 
(Solow 1956). One important implication of the NGM is income convergence between 
regions. If countries have similar population growth, savings, and technology, the NGM 
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implies that the output or income across countries will tend to converge to the same 
steady state. Convergence as implied by NGM means that countries that are poor grow 
faster than the rich ones; that is they „catch up‟ with them in the long run. This catch up is 
based on diminishing returns to scale. A rich country will grow slower as diminishing 
marginal returns to capital set in after accumulating more and more capital. On the other 
hand, a poor country, where capital is scarce, will have a higher return to capital and 
grow faster. 
  There is a wide range of literature that studies the implications and empirical 
validity of the NGM in various ways. One way to test whether countries have converged 
in income is to study the standard deviation of income of the sample over time (Grier and 
Grier 2007). This concept of convergence is called σ convergence and refers to a decrease 
in dispersion of income in a group of economies. Sala-i-Martin (1996) defines this type 
of convergence as follows, „a group of economies are converging in the sense of sigma 
(convergence) if the dispersion of their real per capita GDP levels tends to decrease over 
time‟.This type of convergence is non parametric in the sense that it relies completely on 
how the data behaves and does not impose any restrictions on the data. Studying sigma 
convergence in income or output may not help us make inferences about conditional 
convergence directly as implied by NGM. However, if we conduct similar convergence 
tests for some of the determinants of steady state determinants, we may be able to 
comment on conditional convergence (Grier and Grier 2007).  
In the recent literature, in addition to testing absolute and conditional convergence 
based on classical regression methods, various different techniques of testing for 
convergence have been used. These help us understand the underlying dynamics of 
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income distribution that may get ignored while using sigma convergence. Kar, Jha and 
Kateja (2010) study the convergence among India states using the distribution dynamics 
approach. The authors study per capita income in 21 Indian states over the period 1993-
2005. The study of distribution dynamics of per capita income across the states finds 
evidence for polarization: two convergence clubs among the states. Some middle-income 
states moved to the relatively higher income states while others fell back to the lower 
income states forming two convergence clubs over time. Another paper that uses a 
different approach for studying convergence analysis is Kalra and Sodsriwiboon 2010. 
The authors use non-stationary panel data methods to analyze income convergence 
during the period 1970-2004 across 15 Indian states. This approach also helps to 
investigate for spill over effects across the states. The authors find evidence for 
divergence over the whole sample period and convergence clubs among the high and 
lower income states and small spill over effects. 
For the current paper I use sigma convergence. As pointed out earlier sigma 
convergence does not impose any restrictions on data and can help understand the 
dispersion of income across states. In the following section I explain my data and 
methodology for testing convergence among Indian states. 
1.7 Empirical testing of convergence : Data and methodology 
My sample covers the period 1970 to 2005 and includes data from 15 different states 
including Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, 
Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, Tamilnadu, Uttar 
Pradesh, and West Bengal. These states taken together account for almost 85 percent of 
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India‟s population, and include both poor as well as rich states, thereby making this 
sample fairly representative of the Indian economy.  
 To test for sigma convergence in output I need to estimate the dispersion of output 
over time. In this paper, I use the standard deviation of per capita state domestic product 
as a measure of dispersion of output. The method is as follows. I calculate a time series of 
the standard deviation of income across the 15 Indian states in my sample. Then, I fit a 
time trend to this series. Convergence of output across states would imply that this trend 
is negative and significant. If the time trend is positive and significant, then I can 
conclude that the output is diverging.
11
 To test if the divergence or convergence can be 
explained by the steady state variables, I test for convergence in input variables in the 
same way. I use the following variables as input variables: population growth, literacy 
rate, capital expenditure by state government, and commercial credit given by banks. I 
discuss each of the variables below. Details about the data and their sources are given in 
Table 1.3.  
i) Literacy Rate:  
The literacy rate is an indicator of human capital and a possible determinant of 
economic development. One would expect to see a positive relationship between literacy 
and economic growth although it is not always so.
12
 Specifically, higher levels of literacy 
should be associated with higher quality of labor force and therefore higher economic 
                                                 
11
See Grier and Grier (2007) for more on this. 
12
 For example, see Pritchett 2004. 
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growth. Literacy can increase the efficiency of economic and political institutions and 
help in scientific advances.
13
  
In India, at the national level, 64 percent of the population was literate in 2001
14
. 
This was an improvement from about 34 percent in 1971. Table 1.4 gives the evolution of 
literacy rates in selected states from 1971-2001. From the table, it is clear that literacy 
levels vary a lot across regions. For example in 2001, only 41 percent of the citizens of 
Bihar were literate, while 90 percent of people in Kerala were literate. Kerala, which had 
about 70 percent literacy in 1970, has now reached a par with highly developed countries 
in literacy standards. Most of the states have shown a steady increase in literacy rates 
over the period of 1970-2001. 
ii) Population Growth: 
There is no consensus in the literature on the effect on population growth on 
economic development. There are three schools of thought, namely the pessimists, the 
optimists, and the revisionists (Birdsall 1991). The pessimists, like Malthus (1806), 
Solow (1956), Coale and Hoover (1958), argued that faster population growth and the 
corresponding increase in labor supply compared with capital formation would lower per 
capita consumption. According to the NGM, we would expect to see a negative impact of 
population growth on economic development. On the other hand, optimists look at 
population as a „net contributor‟ to economic growth (Birdsall 1991). Increased 
population can bring about scale economies and encourage technological 
                                                 
13
 For a detailed discussion of relationship between human capital, literacy and economic 
growth see Schultz 1991; Cameron, J. and Cameron, S. 2006. 
14
 The Census of India publishes data at the beginning of every decade. The latest data on 
literacy rates that is available for now is for 2001. The next census data will be available 
in 2011. 
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innovations.(Boserup 1965,1981; Kuznets 1966). Revisionists do not admit to any 
generalization about consequences of population growth and focus on micro-level case 
studies which may vary by time, place, and circumstances (Birdsall 1991). 
 In the case of India, population has been growing at a rapid rate. With a 
population of 1,124.8 million people in 2007, India was the second most populous 
country in the world (World Bank 2009). There has been a lot of discussion about the 
economic consequences of this rapid population growth in the development literature. 
Particularly, Nayyar (2008), and Adabar (2000), among others, find a negative impact of 
population growth on economic development in India. Table 1.5 summarizes the 
population and average annual population growth rate in selected states in India for the 
period 1971-2001. Over the entire period, the average annual growth rate of population 
was 2.03 percent. Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh grew at annual growth rates 
higher that the national average. Kerala, on the other hand has achieved spectacular 
demographic developments. With the population growth at 1.29 percent Kerala, was the 
state with the lowest population growth. 
iii) Investment: 
According to the NGM, we would expect that higher investment would promote 
economic growth. For the purpose of this paper, I divide investment into two types: 
private investment and public investment. Getting a long and reliable time series data on 
investment across states is not possible. Therefore one has to look for proxies for 
measures of investment. For a measure of private investment, the closest proxy is the 
amount of credit given by commercial banks. I use the total credit given by „scheduled 
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commercial banks‟ (SCBs) for this purpose. 15 Although this is not the perfect measure of 
private capital formation or investment, SCBs credit is a good indicator of the same. 
Below, I present a few reasons for choosing this proxy. SCBs in India have almost three 
fourths of the total financial assets of financial institutions in India, thereby conferring 
prime importance to them in financial intermediation (Rajkumar 2005). SCBs consist of 
the following 5 groups according to their ownership and nature of operation: i) State 
Bank of India and its subsidiaries, ii) nationalized banks, iii) regional rural banks, iv) 
foreign banks, and v) other Indian SCBs (private sector).
16
 Aiyyar (2000) found that at 
the national level the correlation coefficient between credit extended by SCB and gross 
private capital formation was 0.93 for the period 1970-1995. Also, Nayyar (2008) finds a 
strong correlation between loans extended by financial institutions and levels of private 
investment at the national level. Therefore given the limitations posed by data 
availability, SCB credit seems like a good proxy for private investment.    
Like private investment, there is no reliable information for all the states. 
Comprehensive public investment data at the sub-national level is not available. The data 
is available at the national level but this cannot be subdivided into state level data 
(Ahluwalia 2000). Hence one also has to look for proxies for public investment levels. 
Some papers in the economic literature use various proxies like developmental 
expenditure by the state (Ahluwalia 2000) and capital expenditure by the state (Adabar 
                                                 
15
 Scheduled commercial banks (SCBs) are all the banks that are included in second 
chapter of Reserve Bank of India‟s act of 1934 (RBI (2009)). 
16
 There are 19 nationalized banks in India. Some of these were nationalized in 1969 and 
some were nationalized in 1980 (india.gov.in 2009). 
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2000; Nayyar 2008).
17
 Nayyar (2008) finds that at the national level there is a strong 
correlation between state wise capital expenditure and gross capital formation in the 
public sector for the period 1975-2003. Following Nayyar (2008) and Adabar (2000), in 
this paper I use capital expenditure by the states in India as an indication of public 
investment expenditure at the state level.  
1.8 Results 
As mentioned earlier, testing for σ convergence involves analyzing the standard 
deviation of NSDP per capita across states. Figure 1.2 plots the standard deviation of 
income for the full sample period. It finds that the standard deviation of NSDP has been 
increasing over time. Thus there is an evidence of σ divergence in income for the full 
sample period across states. Figure 1.3 and 1.4 divide the sample in pre- and post 
liberalization years. Figure 1.3 presents behavior of the standard deviation of income 
from 1970 to1990 (pre liberalization period). It is clear from the figure that states have 
diverged in income over time. This suggests that income divergence in not just post- 
reform phenomena: Indian states have been diverging in income long before the reforms 
were undertaken. To check whether this divergence continued in later years, Figure 1.4 
plots the standard deviation for years 1991 to 2005 i.e. the post liberalization period. I 
find that even in post reform years, the incomes have been diverging. The plot shows a 
positive and significant trend in standard deviation thus showing evidence of σ 
divergence. This indicates that incomes have diverged before as well as after the reforms. 
                                                 
17
Capital expenditures by the states are classified as developmental and non 
developmental expenditures. The expenditure on social and economic services constitutes 
developmental expenditures, while expenditure on general services is treated as non-
developmental (RBI 2004). Kurian (1999) mentions that almost 80 percent of the capital 
expenditure can be classified as development expenditure. 
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Therefore I conclude that there is no evidence of σ convergence in output in the pre- or 
post-reforms period in Indian states.
18
 As Table 1.6 shows the coefficient on time is 
positive and significant at the one percent level in the case of full, pre- as well as post-
reform period.  This finding is supported by Trivedi (2002) who uses data for the period 
1962-92, for 19 Indian states and finds income divergence. Also, if one looks at the pre- 
and post-reform estimations, the divergence becomes more prominent in the post-reform 
period. The slope coefficient in case of post-reform income dispersion is higher than the 
pre-reform period. The trend line in the post-reform diagram is a lot steeper than the one 
in the pre-reform diagram. This means that for a given change in time, the change in 
standard deviation of output was much more during the post-liberalization years than the 
change in standard deviation of output before reforms were undertaken. The states moved 
away from the mean output much faster after the liberalization was undertaken, 
disparities in income among states have increased after the economic liberalization. 
Given the output divergence discussed above, it will be interesting to see whether 
there is any evidence of divergence in the inputs also. I test for sigma convergence in the 
determinants of economic growth discussed above. There is a strong evidence of 
divergence in population, state capital expenditure and commercial bank credit. As seen 
in Figure 1.5, population growth has diverged over time. Figures 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9 show a 
significant positive trend in standard deviation of commercial bank credit for the full 
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 Some studies like Cashin and Sahay (1996) reach opposite conclusion in that they find 
convergence among Indian states during 1961-1991. However, the authors test for 
conditional beta convergence. Therefore the method of testing for convergence is 
different from that of this paper. Adabar (2004) as mentioned earlier also finds income 
convergence during the period 1976-2001. Nevertheless similar to Cashin and Sahay, 
Adabar (2004) focuses on beta convergence and not sigma convergence.  
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period as well as pre and post-reform periods. Again, as was the case with income, this 
divergence is more pronounced in the post-reform period of 1991-2004. The slope 
coefficient increases significantly after the reforms. In addition to bank credit, state 
capital expenditure also has diverged in the pre-reform as well as post-reform period as 
can be gleamed from figures 1.10, 1.11, and 1.12, the dispersion being much higher in the 
post-reform period as compared to the pre-reform years. This can to some extent explain 
the output divergence that is evident from the earlier analysis. However, literacy shows 
evidence of convergence across states. Figure 1.6 shows a negative trend in standard 
deviation of literacy rates across 15 states in the sample. The coefficient on time for the 
whole period is negative and significant at the one percent level as seen in Table 1.6. This 
is puzzling since for output divergence, NGM would imply that literacy rate diverges too. 
However, Pritchett 2004 finds that similar result that the schooling per worker in India 
over the period of 1960-1995 has converged. Grier and Grier (2007) reach similar 
conclusions while studying country-level data. The fall in the disparity in literacy rates 
over time across states may be explained by various factors. In India, overall, there has 
been a slow but steady growth in literacy as mentioned earlier in the paper. 
Improvements in education and literacy rates among the states are significant especially 
in case of Himachal Pradesh and Tamilnadu. The states seem to be getting more 
comparable in literacy rates. Various government and non-government initiative may 
have created this „push-factor‟ towards reaching better literacy levels. Increase in private 
schooling also could have promoted literacy in Indian states. Tooley (2009) describes the 
successes of private schooling among some states in India.The National Literacy Mission 
was undertaken in 1988 to conduct widespread campaigns for adult literacy across states. 
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Subsequently, many states also took initiatives to promote literacy through different 
initiatives like for example Kala Jathas (cultural troupes) and Saksharta Pad Yatras 
(Literacy Foot Marches) in Kerala, organized to generate awareness about literacy. The 
state government of Tamilnadu had started a program to provide mid-day meals to 
schoolchildren in 1982 thereby encouraging the school attendance and providing a boost 
to literacy. Many states have adopted this policy of providing school lunches to 
encourage school attendance. Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan (Literacy for all) was undertaken in 
2000 to promote primary education among children. Various initiatives were taken by the 
governments and non-governmental organizations in providing infrastructure for schools 
and providing training to teachers. These different programs may have helped in 
decreasing the disparity in literacy rates among states and creating awareness about 
education.  
1.9 The effect of economic policy reforms on the state economies- some case 
studies 
Undertaking a study to test whether economic reforms contributed to economic 
growth across states poses data problems. Comparable data on variables like foreign 
direct investment and portfolio investment at the state level for the period 1970-2005 is 
not available. Therefore, in this section I will discuss some descriptive evidence of the 
effect of liberalization in selected states. 
Gujarat was one of the states that benefitted the most in India from liberalization. 
Scholars have pointed out various factors responsible for this, including the fact that 
Gujarat has the longest coastline in India and also has oil and natural gas resources. In 
addition to these geographic advantages, Gujaratis are believed to have a more open mind 
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for entrepreneurship, being traditionally and culturally business oriented. The state 
government in Gujarat has shown a very welcoming attitude towards private investment 
in the post-reform period. After liberalization, Gujarat took the initiative in developing 
infrastructure for the new industries. As a part of the reforms, the electricity sector in the 
state was opened to the private sector. As a result of this step, Gujarat has not faced a 
power shortage in the post reform period. Whereas Gujarat was a state ridden with 
frequent power shortages in the pre-reform period, Gujarat has become a state with a 
marginal surplus of power in the post-reform period. (Dholakia 2000).  In building ports 
and roads too, the state promoted private enterprise. The state government adopted a 
policy of involving private businesses in policymaking, which improved the state‟s 
ability to match industry needs. Dholakia (2007) discusses growth experience in Gujarat 
in various sectors in the pre- and post-reform period. Recently, the government has been 
hosting „Vibrant Gujarat Investment Melas‟ (get-togethers of investors) for promoting 
investment in Gujarat.  
For some southern states, namely Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamilnadu, the 
gains from liberalization came mostly in the form of development of the information and 
technology (IT) sectors. A lot of software industries developed in India after reform as a 
result of the opening up of the economy. Today, software related exports constitute 
almost twenty percent of India‟s total exports to the outside world. The United States and 
United Kingdom have emerged as India‟s major trading partners, accounting for almost 
75 percent of software related trade (Electronics and Computer Software Export 
Promotion Council of India, 2009). Karnataka, a leader in attracting software-based FDI 
in the post reform period, has a highly developed software industry which is often 
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referred to as the „„Silicon Valley of India”. As shown in Table 1.7, the amount of FDI 
inflows that Karnataka attracted during 2000-2006 was almost Rs. 85000 million. As 
mentioned by Joseph (2003), Karnataka accounts for almost one fourth of India‟s total 
software exports. Table 1.8 gives the magnitude of software related exports for selected 
states.  
Andhra Pradesh also made a spectacular progress on the IT front in India, 
developing Hyderabad, also called „Cyberabad‟, as a major IT hub in the country. Rao 
(2003) attributes this great development potential in Andhra to the large amount of good 
human capital and strong government commitment towards IT industry promotion. Major 
developments in the areas of infrastructure were undertaken to attract industry in areas 
like electricity generation. The state government took focused efforts on software 
development and the expansion of related exports. The business processing outsourcing 
(BPO) industry flourished in Andhra
19
. Andhra Pradesh was the first state in India to 
come up with specific information development-enabled services related policy. IT 
enabled services were encouraged for employment generation. As far as e-governance is 
concerned, Andhra has emerged as a leader
20
. There were many IT based modifications 
in the governance of various government departments. For example, Andhra‟s 
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  The business processing outsourcing (BPO), is the subcontracting of some business 
functions or processes to a third party. Back office outsourcing may involve 
subcontracting services like finance or accounting of the company. Front office 
outsourcing involves delegating customer care units. 
20
 United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (portal.unesco.org) 
states  that „E-governance is the public sector‟s use of information and communication 
technologies with the aim of improving information and service delivery, encouraging 
citizen participation in the decision-making process and making government more 
accountable, transparent and effective‟. 
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government introduced „E-Seva‟ under which all the public utility bill payments, tax 
payments, and reservations can be completed on a single website. FAST, Fully 
Automated System for Transport was also introduced to computerize services like the 
issue of driver‟s licenses and vehicle registration. 
Lastly, Tamilnadu is another state that has taken advantage of economic reforms 
through software development. Tamilanadu ranks third in software exports in India after 
Karnataka and Delhi. In 2002 the state government announced a new policy related to the 
Information and Technology (IT) sector. Its objective was to develop the state for 
becoming the „destination of choice‟ for IT investors. In addition to promoting software 
based exports, this policy also aimed at expansion of the IT services to rural areas, and 
minimization of the „digital divide‟ between urban and rural areas. In Madurai District a 
project named „Sustainable Access in Rural India‟ (SARI) was implemented under which 
telephone and internet access was given to all villages. The IT and IT enabled services 
policy also gave capital subsidies among others to promote investment. Chennai, the 
capital of Tamilnadu has today emerged as one of the biggest hosts for BPO, housing 
BPO‟s of the World Bank, Citibank, and others. Tamilnadu has also succeeded to some 
extent, in computerizing its government departments.  
1.10 Conclusion and discussion 
I have shown that there has been sigma divergence in the per capita NSDP of 15 
states in India in both the pre-and post-reform periods. The dispersion of the per capita 
NSDP has grown in the period prior to liberalization as well as after the economic 
liberalization.  Further, the analysis of input variables like population and investment 
suggests divergence as well. Only literacy shows signs of convergence across states. 
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Perhaps the answer to curb this divergence does not lie in reversing the reform process or 
holding back the richer states. Acceleration of economic reforms in the backward areas 
may be beneficial. As I have pointed out, the determinants of growth like investment are 
diverging too. Therefore, particular attention needs to be given to improvements in states 
which are economically backward.  Also, as noted earlier, after liberalization, the role of 
state government and state policy have become an important launch pad of economic 
growth. This is especially the case with investment (Ahluwalia 2000). Therefore rapid 
growth of the lagging economies may call for a proactive role for state governments as a 
facilitator of benefits of the reform process. The recent growth spurt in Bihar can be an 
example that better governance and infrastructure can help the socio-economic 
development of the state. The efficiency and quality of governance and institutions 
should be improved in the laggard states (Sakthivel and Bhattacharya 2004). Public 
investment is a poor substitute for private investment; nevertheless public investment can 
be used to build social and economic infrastructural facilities (Ahluwalia 2000). This may 
help the poorer states to benefit from the more open and less controlled economy and 
thereby achieve higher economic growth. Therefore there can be efforts for increased 
public investment for developing infrastructure. As far as central government is 
concerned, the central assistance to the states may be linked to economic performance 
instead of current practice of unconditional transfers (Ahluwalia 2000). Thus the 
observed economic divergence seems to call for acceleration of reforms and better 
infrastructural facilities in the poorer states. Efforts should be made to make this recent 
economic growth more inclusive. A well- balanced growth across all regions can provide 
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political stability and boost unity in the country. This is important for the onset of the 
second-generation economic reforms in India. 
  Continued economic reforms and inclusive growth in India are important not only 
for the country itself, but also for the rest of the world. As mentioned in the introduction, 
India‟s fast economic growth, combined with its large population, democracy, diversity 
and strategic importance, make India a case worth paying attention to. Fast and sustained 
growth of India, which houses 20 percent of world‟s population, has long term 
implications in terms of increased consumption, investment and savings that get pushed 
in the domestic as well as the world economy. With the demographic transition 
underway, as the younger, working age population gets added to this force, the effect is 
only going to multiply.
21
 In addition to this, India is the world‟s largest democracy. This 
fact, coupled with the fast growing economy, can put an end to the belief that democracy 
and economic development do not co-exist. India stands apart from the other „Asian 
models‟ like Singapore that combine fast growth and authoritarian governments. Lee 
Kuan Yew, minister mentor of Singapore believes that democracy does not often lead to 
development because governments do not establish the stability and discipline necessary 
for government (Schuman 2009). In contrast to this, Manmohan Singh, India‟s Prime 
Minister believes that democratic process builds a stronger consensus behind the policies 
and creates more sustainable growth (Schuman 2009).  
Last but not least, India‟s growth is also of strategic importance to the rest of the 
world. India‟s strained relations in the past with the USA have changed in recent times to 
                                                 
21
 Demographic transition refers to the process of the transformation of countries from 
high birth rates and high death rates to low birth rates and low death rates as part of the 
economic development of a country. 
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warming up of relationships between the two countries (Panagaria 2008). A fast growing 
and regionally balanced India has political and strategic implications for the USA and the 
rest of the world. 
That said, an open, strong, fast growing and regionally balanced India may have a 
lot to contribute to the changing world dynamics. 
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Table 1.1 Literature on economic growth and convergence in India 
Author and year 
 
Period of 
study  
 
Econometric 
method 
 
Results 
 
Sachs, Bajpai and 
Ramiah (2001) 
1980-98 
 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Sources of 
Convergence 
are found to be 
very weak 
Dasgupta, Maiti, 
Mukherjee, Sarkar 
and Chakrabarti 
(2002) 
1960-1996 Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Per capita SDP 
diverges  
Trivedi, K (2002) 1962-1992 OLS, Re-weighted 
least squares  
No evidence of 
unconditional 
β 
Convergence, 
Evidence of 
conditional β 
convergence, σ 
divergence 
Bandyopadhyay S. 
(2002) 
1965-97 Distribution 
Dynamics Approach 
Twin peaks: two 
income 
convergence clubs 
Ghate and Wright 
(2009) 
1970-2004 Non-stationary panel 
data 
Different 
convergence rates 
for different states 
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Table 1.2 Average annual growth rates of the net state domestic product per capita 
for 15 Indian states 
State Pre-reform period (1970-1990) Post-reform period (1991-2004) 
Andhra Pradesh 2.22 4.08 
Assam 2.38 1.31 
Bihar 1.43 1.10 
Gujarat 1.79 4.48 
Haryana 2.72 3.07 
Himachal Pradesh 2.08 4.92 
Karnataka 1.83 3.69 
Kerala 1.76 5.54 
Madhya Pradesh 2.60 2.38 
Maharashtra 3.24 3.40 
Orissa 1.22 2.58 
Punjab 2.24 1.78 
Tamil Nadu 2.73 4.38 
Uttar Pradesh 1.98 1.08 
West Bengal 1.32 4.00 
Full Sample* 2.03 2.21 
  Source: Author‟s calculations using data from Economic and Political Weekly Research 
Foundation. Numbers are percentages. * Total of 15 states. 
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Table 1.3 Explanation of the variables and their sources 
Variable Description 
Growth rate of per capita net 
state domestic product 
The growth rate of Per Capita Net State Domestic Product 
over 5 year intervals. The data is in 2000-01 prices.  
Sources: „Domestic product of states of India, 1960-61 to 
2000-01‟, Economic and Political Weekly Research 
Foundation and  Central Statistical Organization. 
Population Growth 
 
  
The growth rate of population over 5 year intervals. 
Sources: Economic Survey (2007-08), 
www.indiabudget.nic.in 
and Census of India, Office of Registrar General. 
Literacy  Literacy rates for 1971 are for the population aged 5 and 
above and for 1981, 1991, 2001, they are for the 
population aged 7 and above. The Census was not 
conducted in Assam during 1981; in this case the average 
of the preceding and succeeding figures is taken.  
Sources: Economic Survey(2007-08),  
www.indiabudget.nic.in 
and Census of India, Office of Registrar General 
Credit extended by 
commercial banks 
 
The total credit extended by commercial banks over each 
5 year period. Source: 
„Database of commercial banks in India‟, Economic and 
Political    Weekly Research Foundation. 
  
State government capital 
expenditure  
Source: Budget documents of the state governments, 
rbi.com 
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Table 1.4 Literacy rates in selected states 
State 1971 1981 1991 2001 
Andhra Pradesh 24.57 35.66 44.08 60.47 
Assam 33.94 43.00 52.89 63.25 
Bihar 23.17 32.32 37.49 47.00 
Gujarat 36.95 44.92 61.29 69.14 
Haryana 25.71 37.13 55.85 67.91 
Himachal Pradesh 35.00 50.00 63.86 76.48 
Karnataka 36.83 46.21 56.04 66.64 
Kerala 69.75 78.85         89.81         90.86 
Madhya Pradesh         27.27         38.63         44.67         63.74 
Maharashtra         45.77         57.24         64.87         76.88 
Orissa         26.18         33.62         49.09         63.08 
Punjab         34.12         43.37         58.51         69.65 
Tamilnadu         45.50         54.39         62.66         73.45 
Uttar Pradesh         23.99         32.65         40.71         56.27 
West Bengal         38.86         48.65         57.70         68.64 
India         34.45         43.57         52.21         64.84 
  Source: Economic Survey 2007-08. 
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Table 1.5 Population and average annual population growth rate in selected states 
(in ‘000) 
State 1971 2001 
Percentage Change 
from 1971-01 
Andhra Pradesh 43,503 76,210 1.81 
Assam 14,625 26,656 1.94 
Bihar 42,126 82,999 2.19 
Gujarat 26,697 50,671 2.07 
Haryana 10,036 21,145 2.40 
Himachal Pradesh 3,460 6,078 1.82 
Karnataka 29,299 52,851 1.90 
Kerala 21,347 31,841 1.29 
Madhya Pradesh 30,017 60,348 2.25 
Maharashtra 50,412 96,879 2.11 
Orissa 21,945 36,805 1.67 
Punjab 13,551 24,359 1.89 
Tamilnadu 41,199 62,406 1.34 
Uttar Pradesh 83,849 1,66,198 2.21 
 
West Bengal 
 
44,312 
 
80,176 
 
1.91 
India 5,48,160 1,028,737 2.03 
Source: Author‟s calculations using data from Economic Survey 2007-08. 
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Table 1.6 Estimating time trends for output and input variables 
 Full period Pre-reform period 
 
Post-reform period 
Per capita NSDP 140.80*** 
(18.32) 
72.27*** 
(7.65) 
201.02*** 
(13.36) 
Population growth 676.73*** 
(25.05) 
- - 
Literacy rate  -0.04* 
(-2.08) 
- - 
Credit by 
commercial banks 
 
126701.2*** 
(11.04) 
51666.27*** 
(16.30) 
283342.40*** 
(10.77) 
State capital 
expenditure 
39.77*** 
(3.61) 
9.63* 
(1.70) 
98.73** 
(2.15) 
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at the one, five, and ten percent level.  
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Table 1.7 FDI inflows received in selected states in India 
State 2000-2006  
(Millions of Rs.) 
2000-2006  
(Millions of USD) 
Andhra Pradesh 48250.0 1061.4 
Assam 417.4 9.0 
Bihar 33.4 0.8 
Gujarat 41127.3 898.8 
Haryana, Punjab and  15238.3 329.5 
Himachal Pradesh   
Karnataka 84853.8 1876.1 
Kerala 3397.7 75.1 
Madhya Pradesh 2359.1 51.8 
Maharashtra 256854.5 5650.1 
Orissa 3650.0 81.2 
Tamil Nadu 76912.0 1691.7 
Uttar Pradesh 152.7 3.3 
West Bengal 15230.6 334.8 
Source: Fact sheet on FDI, October 2006, www.dipp.nic.in (Department of Industrial 
Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India). 
Table 1.8 India’s electronic and computer software related exports in selected states 
(Millions of Rupees) 
State 2005-2006 2006-2007 
Karnataka 41429 52175 
Tamilnadu 14573 21325 
Andhra Pradesh 12620 19140 
Maharashtra 19644 32100 
Total 114625 158500 
Source: Electronics and computer software export promotion council (2009) 
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Figure 1.1 Average annual growth rate of per capita net state domestic product 
before and after reform in selected states 
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Figure 1.2 The dispersion of per capita state domestic product across 15 states from 
1970 to 2005  
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Figure 1.3 The dispersion of per capita state domestic product across 15 states in the  
pre-reform period 
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Figure 1.4 The dispersion of per capita state domestic product across 15 states in the post-
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Figure 1.5 The dispersion of population growth across 15 states from 1970 to 2005 
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Figure 1.6 The dispersion of literacy across 15 states from 1970 to 2005 
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Figure 1.7 The dispersion of commercial bank credit across 15 states from 1970 to 2005 
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Figure 1.9 The dispersion of commercial bank credit across 15 states for the post-reform 
period 
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Figure 1.10 The dispersion of state capital expenditure across 15 states from 1970 to 
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2 Sectoral output growth and income in India at the state level 
2.1 Introduction 
India has become one of the world‟s fastest growing economies with average growth 
rates of nine percent over the past four years (2005-2009) (World Bank 2009). This is in 
stark contrast to the post independence decade  (1950-1960) growth rate of about three 
percent per year and the five to six percent average rate of growth which prevailed in the 
1980s (Economic Survey 2008).  
In this paper I study the sectoral output across 15 Indian states for the time period 
1970-2005. I find that India‟s fast economic growth is characterized by unique and 
distinctive structural changes in the economy that make the country stand apart from 
other lower middle income developing countries in Asia.
22
 The theory of structural 
changes and economic growth proposed by scholars like Fisher (1939) and Clark (1940) 
argues that as the economy of a country progresses, the output and employment in the 
primary sector will fall and that of the industrial sector and the service sector will 
increase. However, the Indian growth experiences do not match the historically proposed 
and commonly observed trends in sectoral changes in output in other countries.  
First, despite the decline in the agricultural sector‟s share in GDP, the secondary 
sector‟s share in GDP did not take off as expected. Since the 1970s, the share of the 
secondary sector as a percentage of GDP has hovered around 25 percent.  As shown in 
Table 2.1, average share of the secondary sector in GDP for lower income countries is 
around 40 percent or more (World Bank 2010).  Historically, most of the developed 
                                                 
22
 In section 3, I compare India‟s sectoral growth to other developing countries in Asia 
with similar income levels. A detailed analysis brings out the distinctive features of 
Indian sectoral output and employment as compared to other developing countries. 
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countries became service sector dominant economies only after going through an 
elaborate phase of industrial development, where the secondary sector typically 
contributed around 50 percent to GDP (Papola 2005).
23
 Indian economic growth has 
come about mostly by bypassing growth of the secondary (industrial) sector.
24
  
Second, the share of the tertiary sector has grown very rapidly, making India a 
„tertiarized‟ economy- an economy in which the tertiary or the service sector dominates 
the primary and the secondary sector. Table 2.1 shows that despite having an income 
level of a low middle income country, the share of the service sector in GDP in India is 
close to that of a high income country.  
Third, the employment in the service sector is very low. Thus some scholars have 
dubbed Indian economic growth as „jobless growth‟ (Bhattacharya and Sakhtivel 2002). 
The service sector, which is recently the fastest growing sector, makes up the biggest part 
of the GDP, but employs only 28 percent of the population. Thus, the service sector is a 
“major economic sector” but a “minor contributor to employment” (Papopla 2005).This 
feature distinguishes India from other developing countries in Asia, where the share of 
                                                 
23
 As mentioned by Gardner (1997) the US moved more quickly from an industrial 
economy to a service sector economy than other industrialized countries.  Specifically, he 
says that "industry dominated the economy for less than 30 years (early 1900s to mid 
1920s)" and that this contrasts with Britain, where industry "held dominance for over 100 
years (from the 1840s until the late 1960s)."   
24
 As far as less employment growth and output stagnation in case of the industrial sector 
is concerned, India is a part of a broader phenomenon that needs to be explained. 
However in this case too, during 1980‟s and 1990‟s most Asian economies continued 
industrializing at a rapid pace. In contrast to this, during the 1980‟s Latin American and 
South African developing countries experienced a stagnant industrial output growth (post 
1980‟s and 1990‟s) (UNCTAD 2003). Thus the lack of industrial growth has been more a 
feature of Latin American and South African countries than Asian countries. 
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services in total output and in employment match more closely (Papola 2005; Banga 
2005).  
In this paper I study sub-national sectoral output growth patterns and find that 
these unique characteristics also apply at the state level. I examine whether the 
transformation of economic structure at the state level was significantly different in the 
periods before and after these economic reforms were undertaken in India in 1991.
25
 My 
paper contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, I study the relationship 
between per capita and the sector shares at the sub national level. Such studies have been 
carried out previously at the national level but not at the state level. I also include other 
development inputs like investment, literacy rates and population growth to see their 
effect on sector shares. Second, I break the period into pre- and post-reform phases to 
better understand changes in sector shares and growth.  
                                                 
25
 In this paper I do not study the effect of liberalization on sectroal growth. To 
get data on liberalization indicators or proxies like FDI at state level is impossible. The 
effect or non-effect of the various liberalization policies is extensively studied in the 
literarture. The failure of various policies that were a part of „Washington consensus‟ to 
act as growth panacea for developing countries is widely discussed in the literature. There 
are two main classes of arguments: one that attributes reform failures to the problems in 
the very nature of the suggested policy reforms and the other that rests on the erroneous 
or at times half-hearted implementation of these reform policies by the governments.  
Rodrik (2006) discusses the various inherent problems associated with the Washington 
consensus and its failure to provide successful growth strategies. He mentions that these 
policies lacked a strategy of eliminating the fundamental distortions that prevail in 
government and markets affecting accumulation and /or productivity. Instead it only 
emphasized the elimination of deadweight losses resulting from inefficiency. Also, the 
broad objectives of these reform policies can not translate into a „one size fits all‟ or a 
unique set of actions. On the other hand, Krueger (2004) attributed the failure not so 
much to the nature of reforms or to the inherent problems with reforms but to the absence 
of full implementation of these reforms in effective ways. She refers to the policy reforms 
as “meant well tried little and failed much”. Giving examples of Argentina and Turkey, 
she argued that the disappointment with reforms was because of lack of ambitious 
reforms and follow through that was needed to reap the benefits of reforms.  
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The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, I present the theory behind 
structural change and economic growth. Then in section 2.3, I compare India with other 
countries to highlight the unique features of the Indian economy. I discuss the importance 
of a state level study for India in section 2.4. In section 2.5, I discuss the background for 
the economic reforms undertaken since 1991 and detail the sectoral reforms. The state 
level growth experience in the context of the sectoral net state domestic product in the 
pre- and post-liberalization period is explained in section 2.6. Later in section 2.7, I 
discuss the data, the methodology for examining the relationship between income and 
sectoral output shares. Section 2.8 presents results. Section 2.9 concludes. 
2.2 Structural economic change and economic growth  
The development literature claims that as an economy grows its economic 
structure evolves from an agrarian to a non-agrarian one.
 26
 Changes in the allocation of 
output across sectors are expected to be accompanied by similar changes in employment 
shares.
27
  There are various reasons for such structural transformations during 
                                                 
26
 Early work regarding the structure of the economy and economic growth dates back to 
Fisher (1939) and Clark (1940). Clark (1940) emphasizes a three-sector economy (the 
primary sector, the secondary sector and the service sector) and implies that as the 
economy develops, the focus of the economy shifts from the primary to the secondary 
and then finally to the service sector. Kuznets (1971) argued that as the economy 
develops, there will be shifts in the inter-sectoral output: there will be a notable decrease 
in the primary sector‟s share in the total output as the economy advances. This will be 
accompanied by a significant increase in the industrial output and the service sector 
output.   
27
 However, such a structural change in employment shares will depend upon other 
factors. One is whether this structural change in output shares is capital intensive or labor 
intensive. If the non-agricultural industry remains highly capital intensive and skilled-
labor intensive then this may affect the rate of transition of labor from agriculture to non-
agricultural sectors (Pangariya 2008). Secondly, the degree of substitution between 
capital and labor also needs to be taken into account. Also, the presence and types of 
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development. From the demand side, the argument for a shift from primary to the 
secondary sector is based on Engel‟s law, which has to do with the differences in income 
elasticity of demand for products (Fisher 1939; Clark 1940). According to this argument, 
the income elasticity of demand for primary or agricultural sector products is low. 
However, for secondary sector‟s products such as manufactured goods, and also for 
service sector products, the elasticity of demand with respect to income is higher. 
Therefore as the income levels rise, the relative demand for food or agricultural products 
declines and that for manufactured goods and services increases. As a result of changing 
demand, the shares of different sectors of the economy change as the economy develops. 
28
   
There is also a supply-side explanation for the changing sectoral distribution of 
output as an economy progresses (Papola 2005). The primary sector is mainly dependent 
on factors of production like land that are fixed in supply; thus, there is a limit to growth 
without technological growth. This means that diminishing returns set in early without 
corresponding technological changes. In comparison, in the industrial sector, most of the 
factors of production can be augmented with the help of technology and innovation. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
government regulations on services and industries and domestic policy constraints may 
stand in the way of employments transition. 
28
 Kuznets (1966) also based his explanation of shifting patterns of production on demand 
side factors. He pointed out that with the technical advancements in industrial 
development, large-scale manufacturing and geographical concentration of production 
might take place. This leads to a demand for services like transport and communication. 
In addition, higher incomes may necessitate demand for personal services. Kuznets 
proposed that inter-sectoral shifts also reflect technological effects and newer institutional 
arrangements. According to Kaldor (1966), who related the growth of GDP to the growth 
of manufacturing sector, growing services were a by-product of the expansion of the 
secondary sector and increasing levels of income. 
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service sector also can make use of the technical advances for its growth and is not 
dependent on fixed factors of production like the primary sector (Papola 2005).
29
 
More recent studies such as Inman (1985), Ichevarria (1997) and Kongsamut et al 
(2001) also find similar patterns of structural changes in countries. For example, 
Kongsamut, using data for 123 countries over the period of 1970-1989, shows that rising 
per capita income is associated with declining agriculture sector output and employment 
shares and rising service sector output and employment.  
Eichengreen and Gupta (2009, 2010) analyze the relation between per capita 
income and sector shares for the industry and the service sector in India for the 1960 to 
2005 period at the national level. Their results indicate that the industry‟s share in GDP 
has remained stagnant after 1990s. For the service sector, Eichengreen and Gupta (2010) 
note that the share of the service sector in GDP was stunted until1990. However, the 
share picked up in the 1990s to be significantly above the level predicted by the 
international cross section for a country with its level of per capita income. 
As is clear from the above discussion, historically the pattern of structural 
changes as the economy develops has been a decline in primary sector output and 
employment and increase in the industry and tertiary sector output and employment. 
There may have been differences in explaining the reasons behind such output shifts 
across sectors, but the basic pattern of the structural change in economies accompanying 
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 Baumol (1967, 2001) also proposed that there will be a shift from an agrarian to a non- 
agrarian economy as a country developed. However he emphasized that changes in 
sectoral shares take place not as a consequence of changes in demand but because of 
changes in the productivity. According to him, because productivity in the service sector 
rises slower, the employment share of the tertiary sector rises faster. Fuchs (1968) found 
similar results and stressed the differentials in productivity across sectors rather than the 
demand changes. 
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development remains the same. In the next section, I will present a comparison of India 
with other countries with similar income levels and point out what makes India a unique 
case and sets it apart from this historical pattern of structural changes outlined above.   
2.3  Is India unique? 
 As discussed in the introduction, the recent growth of India is characterized by 
some distinctive structural changes that separate it from the other developing countries of 
similar income levels in Asia. India falls in the category of a lower middle-income county 
(World Bank 2007).
30
 In 2007, India had a per capita gross national income (PCY) of 
$950. China, which also belongs to the lower middle-income group, reached a similar 
level of income in 2000. If we compare the sectoral output shares in PCY of China in 
2000 with India, we see a stark difference in the shares of industry and service sector. As 
can be seen in Table 2.2, India had a low share of industry in total output amounting to 
only 29 percent. In contrast, China‟s secondary sector contributed close to 48 percent to 
total output in 2000. The same is the case with countries like Indonesia, Bhutan, Thailand 
and Philippines. Also, in all these countries, the share of services in total output has been 
much lower than India. For example, whereas India‟s service sector contributed around 
53 percent to PCY, Indonesia had only about 43 percent PCY from tertiary sector and 
China‟s service sector contributed only 39 percent to the PCY.  
                                                 
30
 The World bank‟s country classification based on per capita gross national income 
(PCGNI) in 2008: 1) Low income countries- countries having PCGNI of 975 USD or 
less; 2) Lower middle income countries- countries having PCGNI of USD 976 to USD 
3855; 3) Upper middle income countries- countries having PCGNI of USD 3856 to USD 
11905; 4) High income countries- countries having PCGNI of USD 11906 or more. 
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Table 2.3 gives the shares of sectors for selected lower middle countries for the 
years 1970 and 2008. As can be seen, India had a very low industry output share even in 
1970. The secondary sector in India has been a poor contributor to PCY compared to all 
the rest of the countries in this income group. In 1970, China had 40 percent industry 
share in PCY but India had only 21 percent. Indonesia, which had a similar secondary 
sector share in 1970 (around 19 percent), shot up to 48 percent in 2008, while India 
stagnated at 29 percent.  Thus, slow growth and poor contribution of the industrial sector 
in India set it apart from the rest of the developing countries in this income category. 
While India belongs to the lower middle-income group of countries, if we look at 
the sectoral composition of output in 2005, India more resembled an upper middle-
income country. Table 2.1 gives the shares of the three economic sectors across country 
groups in 2005. India‟s service sector output was closer to that of the 61 percent 
characteristic of an upper middle-income country. Also, in case of the manufacturing 
sector, India‟s profile came close to a high-income country. 
 In addition to the differential patterns in the sectoral output, the patterns in 
employment across sectors in India are different as well. The service sector in India 
employs a lot less people than the service sector in other developing countries. Thus it 
has been less „employment intensive‟ as compared to other countries like China and 
Indonesia (Papola 2005). In China and Indonesia, the share of service sector in output 
was similar to the service sector‟s share in employment. For example, according to Table 
2.4, in 2002, China‟s service sector contributed 34 percent to GDP, and employed 31 
percent of the labor force. Indonesia‟s tertiary sector contributed 38 percent to GDP and 
employed 39 percent of the labor force. In contrast to this, India had only 22 percent of 
 63 
 
its people employed in the service sector, which produced 51 percent of the output 
(Papola 2005). This is different from the historically observed patterns in structural 
changes employment that accompany sectoral changes in output. Banga (2005) discusses 
some possible reasons responsible for slow growth of employment in the service sector. 
The author mentions that some services such as community, social and personal services 
that have grown faster and have relatively higher contribution to the GDP have 
experienced a fall in employment elasticity. Also, sectors like the telecommunications 
and software services which are growing fast have higher labor productivity and therefore 
less employment growth. Growth has been concentrated in services that are skilled-labor 
intensive according to Gordon and Gupta (2004). 
Thus there are several interesting structural features of Indian economy. First, 
despite the decrease in agriculture share that accompanied Indian economic growth, 
contribution of industrial sector in the total output was low as compared with other lower 
middle-income countries in Asia. Second, the service sector grew rapidly as compared 
with other countries. Third, the share of service sector in employment was very low 
compared to other countries.  
In the next section, I will discuss the importance of undertaking a state-level study 
of India. 
2.4 Why is a sub-national study important? 
There are several reasons why it is important to study the sub-national economic 
development. First, understanding the regional and sectoral differences after economic 
liberalization has important implications for continuation of economic reforms and the 
development of second-generation reforms. It is important to look at pre- and post-reform 
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dynamics in the economic picture. The economic liberalization undertaken in 1991 
reduced the extent of control by the central government in many areas. Specifically, 
decentralization in areas related to investment led to a higher scope for initiative on the 
part of state and local governments. With less central government control and 
intervention, the states had the freedom to frame policies to attract foreign as well as 
domestic investment. Therefore it is important to study the patterns in economic structure 
and growth before, and after, liberalization was undertaken. Second, it is important to 
note that high rate of economic growth at the national level or the pattern of structural 
transformation observed at the national level need not mean that all the states enjoyed 
equal benefits of this growth spurt. An analysis at the national level may mask the state 
level dynamics of growth. Therefore a regional level analysis is important for getting a 
clearer picture of economic growth. Third, for a diverse country like India, a regional 
level analysis is very important.
31
 Balanced regional growth could provide a strong 
foundation for the political and economic unity of the country and continuance of the 
economic reforms. In the next section I describe the background for economic reforms 
undertaken since 1991 and discuss sectoral reform policies. 
2.5 Economic reform 
In 1991, economic liberalization was officially undertaken in response to the 
balance of payments crisis that India faced at that time.
32
 It was an important and 
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 Diversity is yet another distinguishing aspect of India. No single religion, culture or 
language represents India. It is a secular country and a home to five of world‟s major 
religions. India has 22 official languages. India epitomizes the blend of myriad cultures, 
languages and religions in co-existence. 
 
32
 Trade liberalization started in India in the late 1980s, but a more comprehensive set of 
reforms was only implemented in 1991. Therefore, there is a lot of debate in the literature 
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definitive step toward having a more open economy, indicating a shift from the socialist 
thinking of the Indian National Congress (Congress) government that prevailed until the 
mid-1980s. These economic reforms included changes in industrial policy, fiscal policy, 
external sector policies and financial sector policies. Following its devaluation, the Indian 
Rupee became fully convertible on the current account. Foreign direct investment and 
technology transfers were encouraged, and Indian industries were allowed to access 
international capital markets.  
2.5.1 Reforms in the agricultural sector  
Being a predominantly agrarian economy in terms of employment, the 
performance of the agriculture sector is of utmost importance in India. Agriculture 
employs almost 50 percent of the total labor force in India  (Economic survey 2008). 
However the contribution of this sector to the economy has been declining in recent 
years. In 2007-2008, agriculture and allied activities sector accounted for only 17.8 
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in India. In 2003-04, this share in GDP was 
around 22 percent (Economic survey 2008). In this section, I will discuss agricultural 
reforms that were undertaken in India since 1991. 
The economic reforms that were initiated in 1991 did not contain a 
comprehensive reform agenda for the agricultural sector per se (Thamarajakshi 2000). 
Though there has not been a wide discussion of the reasons behind this, Vyas (2001) 
                                                                                                                                                 
about whether to consider the reforms undertaken in 1985-86 as an indicator of economic 
policy shift or whether the 1991-92 measures be deemed as policy shift. An examination 
of these counterarguments is beyond the scope of this paper. For the current paper, I have 
treated the 1991 economic reforms as an indication of policy shift since these were more 
far reaching than the earlier generation of reforms.  
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presents a few possible reasons for the lack of reform in the agricultural sector. First, 
when it came to agriculture, the issue of food security was important. This made the 
government cautious about radical policy changes to the market. Also, agriculture was a 
state subject (instead of federal/ central), which left more of the policymaking initiative in 
the hands of the state government. 
 If we take a brief look at the 1991 reforms, the route to reforming agriculture was 
thought to be through a reduction in the protection of the industrial sector and the 
transformation of trade policy. As Singh (1995) puts it, the all- pervading protection to 
the industry that was prevalent before 1991 had hurt agriculture in many ways. The most 
important effect of protection and import substituting industrialization was that it had 
raised the prices of non- agricultural products and made it replete with price distortions. 
As buyers of industrial goods, such as agricultural machinery, this had hurt the 
economy‟s rural sector. The pre-reform industrial policy had made industrial production 
more profitable than agriculture, which led to a diversion of investment away from 
agriculture. To take care of this, it was thought that correcting the distortions in the 
industrial sector would benefit the agricultural sector. Once the industries were open to 
competition, the prices of industrial goods would fall and thereby improve the terms of 
trade for agriculture. That is, the relative prices were expected to be altered in favor of 
agriculture by unleashing the industrial sector. In addition, after liberalizing trade and 
devaluing the Rupee, agricultural exports would increase and make the sector more 
profitable.
33
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 However, assuming this has ignored other factors. For example, the impact of trade 
liberalization on the agricultural commodities exports will depend upon relative supply 
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There were several piecemeal reforms that were undertaken in the agricultural 
sector. The most important reform was the abolition of the zonal restrictions on the 
movement of agricultural commodities (Gupta 1998), especially for food grains (Vyas 
2001). In 1993, the central government declared the whole country to be a „single food 
zone‟. In 1998 in a chief ministers‟ conference, states showed willingness to remove the 
movement restrictions.
34
 All limitations, even the informal ones, were to be done away 
with at least in the case of essential commodities. However, this policy reform has not 
seen much success as most state governments have not translated their words into actions 
(Wadhwa 2001). Most states still impose some restrictions on the movement of some 
agricultural goods. 
 The next reform involved privatization. Vyas (2001) notes that privatization was 
given consideration in the agricultural sector after the first phase of reforms. The 
distribution of inputs such as fertilizers, agricultural extension and provision of services 
were opened for private enterprises. Agricultural extension is the application of scientific 
research and new knowledge in agriculture via education of farmers (Vyas 2001). Pre-
reform, this was mostly run by government enterprises, but after the reforms, private 
parties like NGOs were asked to step in and promote education for improved agricultural 
                                                                                                                                                 
and demand elasticity. In case of agriculture the supply elasticity of exports is 
considerably low.  
34
 The chief minister is the leader of the ruling party in the state parliament and heads the 
cabinet ministers. 
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practices through communication and learning activities.
35
 Knowledge about agricultural 
marketing also started getting imparted in these extension activities. 
 In the domestic market, some controls were done away with for particular 
agricultural commodities. For example, non-nitrogenous fertilizers were freed of all the 
controls. Reforms and trade liberalization also helped agriculture through increased 
exports (Ahluwalia 2002). There was an appreciable upswing in agricultural exports after 
reforms (Mishra and Rao 2003). Mishra and Rao (2003) mention that during 1990s, 
exports increased at 8.96 per cent per annum as compared to only 2.43 percent in the 
decade before the economic reforms. Also, India‟s share of agricultural exports as a 
percentage of world exports grew from 1.1 percent in 1990 to 1.9 percent in 1999. This 
share had actually declined in the decade before the onset of reforms (Ahluwalia 2002). 
In 2008 the agriculture sector contributed about 13 percent to national exports (Economic 
survey 2008). 
2.5.2 Reforms in the industrial sector 
Taking a reformist approach and recognizing the impediments in industrial 
development caused by the licensing system, the government redefined its role in the 
industrial sector. The new industrial policy in 1991 declared that, “Government policy 
and procedures must be geared to assisting entrepreneurs in their efforts. This can be 
done only if the role played by the government were to be changed from that of only 
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 There is an extensive literature studying the effects of privatization on economic 
growth and efficiency (see, for example, Gupta (2005), Bennett, Estrin, and Urga (2007), 
Cook and Uchida (2003), Baijal (2002a, 2002b), and Pangariya (2008)). The gains from 
privatization can depend upon the method and sequencing of privatization. 
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exercising control to one of providing help and guidance by making essential procedures 
fully transparent and by eliminating delays.” (Government of India 1991) To accomplish 
this, the government abolished the system of industrial licensing. Irrespective of the 
amount of investment, almost all industries were free from the convoluted licensing 
procedures. Licensing only remained in effect only for eighteen industries that were 
related to security, strategic and environmental issues. Even this list was trimmed in 
subsequent years to bring down the number of regulated industries to five industries, 
including things like arms and ammunition, atomic energy and tobacco. 
The next reform was with respect to the Monopolies Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act (MRTP). The new policy clearly states that the government interference in industry 
through MRTP was proving to be harmful to the health of industrial sector since this act 
limited the benefits of large scale production in industry (Government of India 1991). 
Therefore, there was need for the government to refrain from affecting the investment 
decisions of large firms. To achieve this objective, the new policy put an end to the pre-
entry scrutiny of the MRTP firms (Mahajan 2006). Now it was no longer necessary for 
the firms to seek prior approval from the government for expanding their firm, merging 
with other firms or, acquiring or establishing new undertakings (Government of India 
1991). The revised MRTP put more emphasis on controlling the unfair trade practices 
rather than influencing the investment decisions of business conglomerates. 
Another important reform reduced the scope of the public sector in the economy. 
The new policies acknowledged the fact there were serious problems with the working 
and productivity of the public sector entrepreneurs. In the new policy, the government 
emphasized the need for measures to make public sector enterprises more „growth 
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oriented and technically dynamic‟ (Government of India 1991). In addition to this, the 
policy limited the public sector monopoly to only eight sectors on the basis of security 
and strategic issues. In later years, this list was trimmed to only two sectors, namely, 
railways and atomic energy (Panagaria 2008). 
In recent years, there has been an important development towards liberalizing the 
manufacturing sector in particular. Many industries previously reserved for small-scale 
production are now open for entry by the large-scale firms. Formerly, the Small Scale 
Industries (SSI) Reservation of 1967 included almost all unskilled labor-intensive 
products. This limited the growth of the labor-intensive products industry since the 
benefits of large-scale production could not be reaped in these sectors. However in recent 
years, there has been a shift in this reservation policy. In 2007, only 239 products were 
reserved for small-scale production against a staggering 821 products in 1998. Now, 
products such as, toys, footwear and apparel are off the reservation list (Panagaria 2008). 
In addition, for the products that are still on the SSI list, large scale production is allowed 
if fifty percent or of the more output is bound for exports. 
As far as foreign investment is concerned, the reforms gave automatic permission 
for foreign equity investment up to fifty one percent in thirty four priority industries. This 
abolished the earlier limit of forty percent foreign equity investment in industries 
(Mahajan 2006).  Later the procedure of automatic approval became applicable to almost 
all industries except the ones reserved for public sector monopoly. Industry was opened 
to foreign direct investment in all but four sectors. In the case of foreign technology 
agreements, the policy gave automatic permission for foreign technology agreements in 
high priority industries up to a lump sum payment of Rs. 10 million, five percent royalty 
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for domestic sales and eight percent for exports (Government of India 1991). In the 
subsequent years, this was extended to all industries. 
2.5.3 Reforms in the service sector 
As far as the reforms in the service sector are concerned, there was no separate policy 
package for the service sector per se. Unlike the secondary sector, the service sector did 
not get any comprehensive set of policy changes. However, the overall changes in policy 
regarding deregulation, opening up of FDI and privatization of services previously owned 
by government were important to the growth of service sector (Gordon and Gupa 2003). 
After reviewing the economic policy reforms that were undertaken since 1991, I 
discuss the sectoral growth at the national and state level. 
2.6 Sectoral growth at the national and state level 
In this section, I present the pattern of sectoral shares in the net state domestic 
product (NSDP) in Indian states over time. I will also investigate the growth rates of the 
primary, secondary and tertiary sectors before and after the economic reforms.  
In India, the share of the primary sector has decreased significantly over time. The 
agriculture and related activities‟ share in India‟s net state domestic product was around 
51 percent in 1970, thus making it a mostly agrarian country
36
. However, as the country 
developed, this share came down to 35 percent in the next two decades. Even in the post-
reform period of 1991-2005, the decrease in the primary sector‟s share continued, 
bringing it down to almost 23 percent in 2005. Figure 2.1 shows that there is a substantial 
difference between the mean percentage share of primary sector in the pre-reform period 
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 India here refers to the aggregate of 16 states and it represents almost 95 percent of the 
population. These are the states for which data is available.  
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and the mean percentage share in the post-reform period. The pre-reform period mean 
share is about 44 percent. This lowers to 31 percent primary sector share in the total 
NSDP in the post-reform years. This difference of almost 14 percent is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level.  Thus the mean share of agricultural sector has dropped 
significantly in the years after liberalization. As far as the growth rate of the agriculture 
and related activities‟ sector is concerned, there was a drop in the post reform period as 
compared to the pre-reform period at the national level. For the states of Punjab and 
Haryana, both leaders in agriculture, the growth rate of NSDP in agriculture was lower in 
the period after the economic reforms. However the percentage of primary sector output 
in the total NSDP in Punjab still remains higher than all other states at almost 36 percent. 
States like Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamilnadu which were leaders in service sector 
in the post-reform period registered a higher primary sector‟s NSDP growth rate in the 
post-reform period, thus growing both in services as well as agricultural sector. 
The share of the secondary sector in NSDP has more or less remained stagnant 
over the sample period. At the national level, this sector contributed around 21 percent to 
the total NSDP in 1970. This percentage steadily grew in the pre reform period to reach 
27 percent in 1990. After that, however, the share of the secondary sector declined. In the 
pre-reform period the secondary sector grew at the rate of 5.38 percent. This growth rate 
fell to around 4.95 percent in the post-reform period. For the entire period of 1970-2005, 
at the national level, the share has stayed within the range of 21 percent to 27 percent of 
NSDP. If we look at the pre- and post- reform mean difference in the secondary sector 
share, we hardly see any change. Figure 2.1 shows the mean percentage share of 
secondary sector in the years before and after the reforms. In the years before 
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liberalization, the mean share was 23 percent. This changed to 24 percent in the years 
after liberalization. Thus there is an increase of just 1.45 percent in the secondary sector 
mean share during post-reform period. This change is statistically significant at the 10 
percent level.  
The secondary sector‟s growth in the 1970s was dampened by various policies that 
hindered the growth of the manufacturing sector in India. The emergence of the „License 
Raj‟ was one of these.  This meant that before setting up any entrepreneurial initiative, 
one had to go through a lengthy process of procuring a license, and had to face numerous 
regulations (Panagaria 2008; Das 2001). Second, in addition to these licensing processes, 
the imports of raw materials and capital goods were restricted. There were multiple 
excise duties on goods.
37
 Third, the public sector had monopolies in services like 
banking, airlines, and electric power. The sectors that were open for private investment 
were limited. Fourth, the Monopoly Restrictive Trade Practices act (1969) limited the 
size of existing firms. Even after the 1991 reforms, a lot of industries were reserved for 
the small-scale industries (SSI) by the SSI Reservation Act which limited the scope of 
large-scale manufacturing (Panagaria 2008). Fifth, stringent labor laws also posed an 
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 However, there is mixed evidence on the effect of removal of import substitution on 
economic development. The elimination of import substituting policy by itself may not 
lead to increased efficiency or productivity. Complementary policy changes in market 
integration, labor market reforms and other institutional policies are equally important to 
harbor positive effect of trade liberalization (Braer, (1972), Braga, (2006)). These points 
apply to domestic and external financial liberalization as well. For example Alves and 
Paula (2006) study the effects of foreign bank entry in Brazil and Argentina. The authors 
find that the entry of foreign banks did not contribute effectively to the macroeconomic 
stability and efficiency of the financial system. There was no evidence of a diversified 
portfolio. Other studies, like Schultz (2004) and Mougillansky, Studart and Vergara 
(2004) also study the effect of foreign banks in Latin America.  
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impediment in the path of efficiency and growth of industrial sector. These factors may 
have led to the bypassing of industrial development stage in India development 
experience since the 1970s.  
Panagaria (2008) extensively discusses the employment and output growth in India in 
the industrial sector. A few points need to be mentioned while analyzing the Indian case. 
India has abundant unskilled labor. However, the Indian industry is mostly remained 
capital or skilled-labor intensive. As Panagaria (2006) mentions, the government began to 
enact policies aimed at the development of heavy industries right after independence in 
an attempt to be an independent and self-sufficient country. In Panagaria‟s words, 
“….Beginning in the 1960s, India gradually shifted to the autarkic path to development, 
which necessitated the creation of a large machinery sector.  But in addition, starting with 
the Second Five Year Plan, the promotion of heavy industry was adopted as an explicit 
goal by the government.  Later, in the early 1970s, the government confined the 
successful, large business houses (the so-called “dominant” undertakings) to a group of 
19 heavy investment sectors.  This naturally created further bias in favor of capital-
intensive industries and scuttled the growth of the labor-intensive industry.” (Panagaria 
2006:16). Also, the encouragement of engineering and chemical industries called for 
extensive use of skilled labor. Some of the fastest growing sectors in India namely, 
Telecommunications, Automobile, Pharmaceuticals and Software industry have remained 
mostly skilled labor intensive. Therefore, the lack of development of unskilled-labor 
intensive sector in India may be one of the many causes that is holding back industrial 
development in India. The fact that in spite of various liberalization measures, the of 
growth in the industrial sector has not been impressive indicates that some domestic 
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policy restraints such as  strict labor laws that discourage the entry of large scale 
unskilled labor intensive firms in the industrial sector, may be responsible for such 
stagnancy.   
In a country like India that has a large population of unskilled labor, industrial 
development and availability of livelihood to the people through secondary sector jobs 
can play a vital role in reducing poverty (Panagaria 2008). As pointed out by the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), “a competitive and 
environmentally sustainable industry plays a crucial role in accelerating economic 
growth, thereby reducing poverty” (UNIDO 2010). Thus if India is to achieve a pro-poor 
and balanced growth, the development of industry cannot be ignored.  
Another feature of sectoral output in India is the fast growth of the services sector. 
If we look at the early years in the sample, the tertiary sector‟s output in total NSDP was 
only about 28 percent of total output at the national level. Over time, the tertiary sector 
grew rapidly and its share in output increased to almost 53 percent in 2005. Today it is 
the fastest growing sector of Indian economy. The increase in the tertiary sector‟s share 
in total output in the post-reform period was 14 percent as against the 9 percent gain in 
share experienced by the sector in the pre-reform years. During the period before 
economic reforms were undertaken, the service sector‟s mean share in the total NSDP 
was around 31 percent. However this increased to almost 44 percent in the post-reform 
period. Figure 2.1 shows the difference in mean for mean tertiary sector output share. The 
12 percent change in mean share is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
As for the states, service sector has grown at a more rapid pace in some states 
than others. For example as shown in Figure 2.2, if we look at Gujarat and Andhra 
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Pradesh, both states started at similar tertiary sector share in the total output during 1970 
(29.40 percent for Andhra Pradesh and 30.26 for Gujrat). However, in Andhra Pradesh 
the tertiary sector has a grown to have a higher share in total NSDP (52 percent in 2005) 
than Gujrat (42 percent in 2005). As is seen from Figure 2.2, for most of the southern 
states like Kerala and Tamilnadu, tertiary sector share in the NSDP has been growing at a 
faster pace. 
Various scholars have analyzed the reasons for such rapid growth in the Indian 
service sector (Banga 2005; Gupta and Grodon 2003). Banga (2005) argues that demand 
side factors like high-income elasticity of demand for final product services, and 
structural changes in the manufacturing sector, have led to such a fast growth of services. 
Also, according to Banga (2005), supply side factors like economic liberalization, 
improvements in technology and higher foreign investment in the service sector might 
have boosted the growth of the tertiary sector. Gupta and Gordon (2003) claim that 
splintering and high foreign demand may be possible contributors of rapid service sector 
growth. 
The following section presents data and methodology for examining the link 
between per capita income and other development inputs and sectoral output shares at the 
state level. 
2.7 Relationship between income and sectoral output shares at the state level 
My sample covers the period 1970 to 2005 and includes data from 16 different states 
including Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, 
Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu, 
Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. These states taken together account for over 95 percent 
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of India‟s population, and include both poor as well as rich states, thereby making this 
sample fairly representative of the Indian economy.  
The primary sector consists mainly of agriculture and related activities such as 
fishing, and forestry and logging. The secondary sector is comprised of i) mining and 
quarrying, ii) manufacturing, iii) construction, and iv) electricity, gas, and water supply. 
Lastly, the tertiary sector includes i) transport, storage and communication ii) trade, 
hotels and restaurants iii) banking and insurance iv) real estate, ownership of dwellings 
and business services v) public administration and vi) other services. The data on per 
capita net state domestic product is taken from EPW (2002).  
I analyze the association between the per capita income and changes in economic 
structure at the state level in India. My purpose here is to study the relationship between 
per capita income and the primary, secondary and the tertiary sector‟s shares in the NSDP 
at the sub-national level.  Many other factors besides just per capita income may have an 
effect on the shares of Primary, Secondary and Tertiary sectors in GDP. Therefore, I also 
take into account the other development inputs like investment, population, the literacy 
rate and study what effect these have on the output shares of these three sectors at the 
state level.
38
 
                                                 
38
 There are many other determinants of sectoral shares besides these common 
development inputs. There is a huge literature that talks about the determinants of 
sectoral growth in different aspects and in different countries. However, studying the 
causes and determinants of each sector‟s output and growth in detail is out of the scope of 
my paper. I study the patterns in sectoral growth at the regional level, nevertheless what 
might have caused the sectoral output growth or stagnation is beyond the subject of this 
paper. I have taken into consideration the factors for which consistent data is available for 
the time period in my sample. For example, primary sector output is affected by various 
factors such as arable land, climate, and usage of fertilizers, other inputs per acre of 
arable area, prices and policies of the government. Some studies that analyze 
determinants of agricultural output in countries like Kenya and Nigeria for example, 
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One point that needs to be considered while undertaking empirical analysis is that 
there is possibility of a feedback effect between sector shares and per capita income. As 
the theory predicts, per capita income has impact on the sector shares in output and 
resulting structural transformation but at the same time it is also possible that these sector 
shares have bearing on the per capita income. Thus there may be a problem of 
endogeneity. To take care of this, I use instrumental variable while estimating the 
equations. I have used the lagged value of per capita income as an instrument for per 
capita income. Based on the first stage results the lag of per capita income was found to 
be an appropriate instrument [in all cases in the first stage regression of per capita income 
(endogenous variable) on lag of per capita income (instrument) and other variables), the 
coefficient on lag of per capita income was statistically significant). Below I explain the 
other variables in the equation. Details of the variables and sources are given in Table 
2.5. 
1) Capital expenditure by the state government: I use capital expenditure by the state 
as a proxy for public investment. 
39
 Investment is a prerequisite for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
conduct the study at the country level (see Odhiambo et al. (2004) and Oyekale (2007). 
But getting such data for a period of 1970-2005 at the state level is impossible. There is 
no consistent data on private investment at the state level in the agricultural sector. For 
manufacturing and service sector, factors like demand elasticity, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and trade liberalization also may have an impact. I discuss this more in 
the discussion section on page number 31 and 32. Again to get data on liberalization 
indicators or FDI at the state level poses problems. For instance, consistent data on FDI at 
the state level is available only for 2001-2005.  
39
 Comprehensive public investment data at the sub-national level is not available. The 
data is available at the national level but this cannot be subdivided into state level data 
(Ahluwalia, 2000). Hence one also has to look for proxies for public investment levels. 
Some papers in the literature use various proxies like developmental expenditure by the 
state (Ahluwalia, 2000) and capital expenditure by the state (Adabar (2000), Nayyar, 
(2008)). Nayyar (2008) finds that at the national level there is a strong correlation 
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development of primary, secondary and tertiary sectors in an economy. There are 
various types of investments, like investment in infrastructure, investments in 
better inputs for example, better technology and training to workers among others 
that facilitate the growth of output in various sectors of the economy. We would 
expect investment to be positively related to output in all the three sectors. 
2) Literacy rate: The literacy rate is an indicator of human capital and a possible 
determinant of economic development. Higher levels of literacy may be 
associated with higher quality of labor force and therefore beneficial for the 
skilled labor intensive service sector and manufacturing sector. In the case of 
agriculture, literacy may also increase output if it leads to more informed 
production decisions.  
3) Population growth: Population growth may have a positive effect on sectoral 
production in a labor-intensive economy through its effect on increased 
availability of labor. 
4) Initial income: Initial income may affect the sector shares. A state that is better 
endowed and has higher income level may help boost the output as it has higher 
levels of income to start with. 
5) Coastal Dummy: I create a dummy variable which equals 1 if the state is a coastal 
state and 0 otherwise.  Sachs (2001) has found a positive link between economic 
growth and access to the sea (Sachs 2001). The states that are coastal have easier 
access to the ocean and therefore may benefit more easily from ocean trade as 
                                                                                                                                                 
between state wise capital expenditure and gross capital formation in the public sector for 
the period 1975-2003. 
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compared to the landlocked states. Thus we would expect to see a positive 
relationship between sector shares and coastal dummy.  
2.8 Results 
 Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 present the results for the primary sector for the full 
sample period (1970-2005). Table 2.6 provides the results of the OLS estimation, 
whereas Table 2.7 summarizes the results for the IV estimation. In each of these two 
tables, there are three columns, each with a different specification. In column 1, I have 
included time effects in addition to the other independent variables. In column 2, I have 
taken into account time as well as state fixed effects, which helps to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity across the states in the sample. In column 3, I include a dummy 
variable indicating whether the state in question is a coastal state or not.   
Column 1, 2 and 3 of Table 2.6 show that per capita NSDP has no significant 
effect on the share of primary sector share in total NSDP. The coefficient on per capita 
income is negative however it is not statistically significant. The coefficients on the 
literacy rate and state capital expenditure have negative signs indicating that as literacy 
rates and state capital expenditures increase, the share of the primary sector in NSDP 
decreases.  These coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent level. One 
interpretation of this negative effect of literacy rate in Indian states could be that as 
people become more literate, they concentrate on more non-farm activities, thus causing 
output in the primary sector to fall. Education may open the doors to alternative sources 
of employment for farmers. For the state capital expenditure, I expect that higher 
investment by the state in for example, better roads and electricity provision will help 
boost the primary sector‟s output. However, I find a negative impact of state capital 
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expenditure. This may suggest that most state capital expenditure gets translated into a 
boost for non-farm sector activities over farm-related ones. Neither population growth 
nor initial income has a significant impact on the primary sector share. In column 3, the 
coastal dummy has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. If the state is 
coastal then the share of primary sector in NSDP declines. This is intuitive in the sense 
that access to the sea will boost the activities related to trade and thus may cause a shift to 
non-farm activities.  
Table 2.7 presents the results for estimation using instrumental variables (IV). As 
mentioned earlier in the paper the OLS estimated may be biased because of possible 
endogeneity of the per capita NSDP variable. I have used the lag of per capita income as 
an instrument. Based on the first stage results this was found to be a relevant instrument. 
Column 1, 2 and 3 show that using IV does not change the results very much. The 
coefficient on per capita NSDP is still statistically insignificant. Literacy and state capital 
expenditure continue to be negatively related to the share of primary sector in total output 
(the statistical significance level literacy rate coefficient changes to ten percent).  
Next I will discuss the results for the secondary sector. Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 
present the results of OLS and IV estimation on secondary sector share respectively. 
Similar to earlier tables, there are 3 specifications in each of these tables: Column 1 
includes time effects, column 2 accounts for time and state effects, and column 3 has time 
effects and a seaside dummy. Column 1, 2 and 3 of Table 2.8 show that in case of 
secondary sector, per capita NSDP is positively related to the share of secondary sector in 
total NSDP. The coefficient on per capita income is statistically significant. Literacy rate 
and state capital expenditure is positively and significantly related to secondary sector 
 82 
 
share. However, as seen in column 2, state capital expenditure is not significant once 
state effects are accounted for. Initial income has a negative and significant coefficient 
indicating that at lower levels of initial income the share of industrial sector is high. 
Including a costal dummy does not have any significant effect on secondary sector 
output.  
Column 1, 2 and 3 of Table 2.9 show IV estimates of the effect of per capita 
income on share of secondary sector. The results of IV estimation are different in that the 
positive effect of per capita income on secondary sector share found in case of OLS 
estimation vanishes in IV estimation in all specifications. Literacy rate continues to have 
a positive effect. Population growth and capital expenditure by the state have a positive 
and significant effect. However, when I add state effects in column 2, state capital 
expenditure is not significant anymore. The coastal dummy remains insignificant in IV 
estimates.  
Next, Table 2.10 and 2.11 give OLS and IV estimates respectively for the tertiary 
sector. Column 1 and 3 of 2.10 indicate that per capita income does not have any 
significant effect on the tertiary sector‟s output share. Literacy rate and state capital 
expenditure have positive and significant effect on share of the tertiary sector in total 
NSDP. Population growth has a negative impact on the tertiary sector share. When I 
include state fixed effects in Column 2; the per capita income has a negative and 
significant effect on tertiary sector share. The coastal dummy is seen to have positive and 
significant effect on tertiary sector output. 
 When I conduct the estimation using instrumental variables (Table 2.11), the 
results do not change much except that the negative effect of per capita income on 
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tertiary sector output found in OLS estimation (Table 2.10, column 2) turns into an 
insignificant effect.   
To summarize, from the above discussion it can be said that in the full sample 
period (1970-2005), the per capita income fails to have a significant effect on the primary 
sector‟s and the tertiary sector‟s share. In case of the secondary sector, the significant 
positive effect of per capita income disappears when the estimation is done using IV.  
2.9 Conclusion and discussion 
In this paper I have studied the sectoral output growth and sectoral output shares 
at the state level in India, before and after the economic reforms in 1991. The data shows 
that the growth of secondary sector has stagnated during all the three sample periods 
namely, full period (1970-2005), pre-reform period (1970-1990) and post-reform period 
(1991-2005). In the years before liberalization, the mean share of the secondary sector in 
NSDP was 23 percent. This changed to 24 percent in the years after liberalization. Thus 
there was an increase of just 1.45 percent in the secondary sector mean share during post-
reform period. The primary sector‟s share in the total output has declined with increasing 
per capita income conforming the theoretical prediction. There is a considerable and 
statistically significant difference between the mean percentage share of primary sector in 
the pre-reform period and the mean percentage share in the post-reform period. As far as 
the tertiary sector is concerned, it has experienced rapid growth over the sample period. 
During the period 1970-1990, the service sector‟s mean share in the total NSDP was 
around 31 percent. However this increased to almost 44 percent in the post-reform period 
of 1991-2005. This 12 percent difference in mean for mean tertiary sector output share is 
statistically significant.  
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I have also investigated for the effect of increasing per capita income and other 
development inputs like investment, population and literacy rate on the changes in 
sectoral shares. I find literacy rates and state capital expenditure to be positively and 
significantly linked to the increase in tertiary sector output.  
It would have been interesting to include a variable that reflects the extent of 
economic liberalization to study the effect of policy reforms on sectroal shares. But such 
study at the state level poses data problems. There are various studies that analyze the 
„realized‟ impact of liberalization policies in addition to the „expected‟ benefits of policy 
reforms on economic growth and sectoral output. Levchenko, et al. (2007) study the 
impact of liberalization policies at the industry level on production, employment, firm 
entry, capital accumulation, and productivity. The indicators of financial liberalization 
used by them are Gross capital inflows (which is the sum of gross inflows and gross 
outflows) and indices of the extent of liberalization in the stock market, the banking 
system, and freedom of international transactions for 28 countries. Another study that 
talks about effect of liberalization and other policy reforms is Easterly (2001) Here he 
uses terms of trade and interest on external debt as one of the independent variables to see 
their effect on economic growth across countries. Gordon and Gupta (2003) use growth 
of export of services, FDI and liberalization dummies for reforms in service sector to 
study the reasons for rapid growth of the service sector in India. However, data for the 
different variables that above mentioned studies use which help in indicating the policy 
reforms or extent of liberalization, is not available at the state level in India. Thus there 
exists a data availability constraint in studying the realized impact of policy reforms on 
sector-wise employment and productivity growth in India. 
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Along with the socio-economic characteristics, role of economic liberalization 
undertaken in 1991 and state policies in service sector growth is important. The economic 
liberalization that began in 1991 reduced the extent of control by the central government 
in many areas. Specifically, decentralization in areas related to investment led to a higher 
scope for initiative on the part of state and local governments. It would be interesting to 
investigate the possible effect of differences in policies of tertiary dominant states and 
other states.  The role of the state in taking advantages of the policy reforms, and taking 
necessary steps to implement these in their own states, may have played a significant role 
in their economic development. Some of the price-based interventions, like giving tax 
incentives, subsidies, and other direct interventions like providing better infrastructure to 
the businesses, could have enabled some states to reap higher benefits of economic 
liberalization. For example In 2002 Tamilnadu government announced a new policy 
specifically related to information and technology sector. Its objective was to develop the 
state for becoming the „destination of choice‟ for IT investors and promoting software 
based exports. Andhra Pradesh also has a strong government commitment towards IT 
industry promotion. Major developments in the areas of infrastructure were undertaken to 
attract investments in the service sector. The state government took focused efforts on 
software development and the expansion of related exports. Even in E-governance 
Andhra has emerged as a leader.
40
 There were many IT based modifications undertaken 
in the governance of various government departments.   Thus some of these service 
                                                 
40
 United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (portal.unesco.org) 
states that, „E-governance is the public sector‟s use of information and communication 
technologies with the aim of improving information and service delivery, encouraging 
citizen participation in the decision-making process and making government more 
accountable, transparent and effective.‟ 
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sector dominant states may have benefitted from active government participation in 
development process. Studying this along with other socio-economic causes and effects 
of tertiary sector growth at state level in India can be an interesting future research.  
There is an extensive literature that discusses the differential patterns of sectoral 
growth and development across countries and the failure of countries to move to next 
stage of industrialization given liberalization in various perspectives. Imbs and Wacziarg 
(2003) study the sectoral output concentration among countries. They use various 
indicators of sectoral concentration such as the Gini coefficient for inequality of sector 
shares, coefficient of variation across sector shares and the min-max spread in sector 
shares. The authors conclude that most economies go through two stages of 
diversification, in the beginning the sectoral diversification increases but after reaching a 
particular level of income countries start concentrating again leading to a u-shaped 
sectoral concentration. Krugman (1981) presents a model that analyses the unequal 
development across countries.  The author shows  that  „uneven  development‟  depends 
upon the  initial  difference  in  capital-labor  ratios  between  the two  countries. 
Accumulation of capital will lead to the division of the world into a capital-abundant 
industrial region and agricultural region that lacks capital.  The assignment of these 
industrial and agricultural roles depends upon which country has more capital to start 
with.  Given the international mobility of capital, the second stage of development 
depends upon foreign investments that can be attracted. 
 Hausman et al (2007) shed light on the relationship between the type of goods that 
a country produces and exports and its subsequent economic growth. The authors 
conclude that countries that export goods which are linked with higher productivity levels 
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grow faster. Growth takes place as result of resource transfer from lower-productivity 
activities to the higher-productivity goods that is in turn a result of cost-discovery process 
on part of entrepreneurs. They suggest that the benefits that a country can garner from 
liberalization will thus depend upon how closely a country can align itself to production 
of such goods. Studying the Indian development experience on the lines of above-
mentioned literature threads can be part of future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 88 
 
2.10 References 
Ahluwalia M .S. (2000), “Economic Performance of States in Post-Reforms Period,” 
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 35, No. 19, pp.1637-48. 
Ahluwalia M .S. (2002), “Economic Reforms in India Since 1991: Has Gradualism 
Worked?” Journal of  Economic Perspective, Vol. 16, no. 3, 2002, pp. 67–88. 
Banga, R.(2005), “Critical issues in India‟s service-led growth,” Indian council for 
research on international economic relations,Working Paper No. 171.  
Baumol, W.J.(1967), “Macroeconomics of unbalanced growth : the anatomy of urban 
crisis,” American Economic Review, Vol.57. 
Bhattacharya, B.B and S. Sakthivel, “Economic Reforms and Jobless Growth in India in 
the 1990's,” Institute of Economic Growth, Working paper No: E/245/2004. 
Clark C. (1940), The conditions of economic progress. McMillan, London. 
Echeverria , C. (1997), “Changes in sectoral composition associated with economic 
growth,” International Economic Review, Vol. 38, No.2. 
Eichengreen, B. and Gupta, P. (2009), “The Two Waves of Service Sector Growth,” 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.14968. 
Eichengreen, B. and Gupta, P. (2010), “The service sector as India‟s road to economic 
growth?” Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, Working 
paper No. 249, New Delhi. 
Fisher A.G.B. (1939), “Production: Primary, secondary and tertiary,” The economic 
journal, Vol. XV.  
Fuchs, V.R. (1968), The service economy, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Gordon J. and Gupta P. (2003), “Understanding India‟s services revolution,” IMF-
NCAER conference, November 14-16, New Delhi. 
Government of India (1991), Statement of industrial policy. Ministry of Industry, New 
Delhi, India. 
Government of India (2008), Economic Survey, www.indiabudget.nic.in 
Inman R.P. (1985), Introduction and overview in managing the service economy: 
prospects and problems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Joseph, M. (2003), “Performance of the southern states- a comparative study,” Economic 
and Political Weekly, pp.3915-3930 
 89 
 
Joshi, V., and I.M.D. Little (1996), India’s Economic Reforms: 1991-2001.Oxford 
University Press, New Delhi. 
Kaldor, N. (1966), Causes of slow rate of economic growth in the United Kingdom. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
Kongsamut, P. ,Sergio R., and Danyang X. (2001), “Beyond balanced growth,” IMF 
working paper, WP/01/85. 
Kuznets, S. (1966), Modern economic growth: Rate, structure and spread. New Haven 
CT: Yale university press. 
Kuznets, S.(1971), Economic growth of nations: total output and production structure. 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
Kumar N. (2000), “Economic Reforms and their Macroeconomic Impact,” Economic and 
Political Weekly, March 4, 2000, pp. 803-812. 
Misra, V.N. and Rao, G. (2003), “Trade policy, agricultural growth and rural poor: Indian 
experience, 1978-1999,” Economic and Political Weekly, October 25, 2003. 
Panagaria, A. (2008), India: the Emerging Giant. Oxford University Press, USA. 
Panagaria, A. (2004), “Growth and Reforms during 1980s and 1990s,” Economic and 
Political Weekly, June 19, 2004, pp.2581-2594. 
Papola T.S. (2005), Emerging structure of Indian economy: Implications of growing 
inter-sectoral imbalances, Presidential address, 88
th
 conference of The Indian Economic 
Association. 
Shand, R. and Bhide (2000), “Sources of economic growth: regional dimensions of 
reforms,” Economic and Political Weekly, October 14, 2000. 
Shetty, (2003), “Growth of SDP and structural changes in state economies: interstate 
comparison,” Economic and Political Weekly, December 6, 2003. 
Thamarajakshi, R.(1999), “Agriculture and economic reforms,” Economic and Political 
Weekly, August14,1999. 
The Hindu (2009), “World Bank: India to Return to 8-to-9 p.c. Growth in 2 Years,” The 
Hindu , Dec 4, 2009, Article 59980, www.beta.thehindu.com 
Vyas, V.S (2001), “Second round of economic reforms,” Economic and Political Weekly, 
March 10, 2001. 
 90 
 
Wadhwa, M. (2001), “Parking space for the poor; restrictions imposed on marketing and 
movement of agricultural goods in India,” Research Internship Papers, Center for Civil 
Society. 
World Bank (2009), India Country Overview 2009, www.worldbank.org.in 
World Bank (2010), www.worldbank.org.in  
 
  
 91 
 
Table 2.1 Average sectoral shares in per capita gross national income across country 
groups in 2005 
 Agriculture 
(percent) 
Industry 
(percent) 
Service (percent) 
Low income Countries 28 26 46 
Low middle income 
countries 
15 40 45 
Upper middle income 
countries  
6 33 61 
High income countries 2 26 72 
Source: www.worldbank.org 
Table 2.2 Comparing India’s sectoral shares in per capita income (PCY) with other 
lower middle income countries in Asia 
Country PCY in 
USD 
Year Agriculture’s 
share in PCY 
Industry’s share 
in PCY 
Service’s 
share in 
PCY 
India 950 2007 18 29 53 
China 930 2000 15 46 39 
Indonesia 900 1994 17 41 43 
Bhutan 910 2003 26 39 35 
Thailand 1020 1989 16 35 49 
Philippines 920 1994 22 33 45 
Source:  www.worldbank.org 
Table 2.3 Sectoral shares in per capita gross national income across countries over 
time 
 Agriculture Industry Service 
 1970 2008 1970 2008 1970 2008 
India 42 18 21 29 37 53 
China 35 11 40 49 25 40 
Indonesia 45 14 19 48 36 37 
Thailand 26 12 25 46 49 43 
Lower middle 
income countries‟ 
average 
35 14 32 41 33 45 
Source: www.worldbank.org 
 
Table 2.4 GDP and employment shares in services across countries in 2002 
Country GDP share of services Employment share of 
services 
India 51 22 
China 34 31 
Indonesia 38 39 
Philippines 53 47 
Source: Papola (2005) 
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Table 2.5 Explanation of the variables and their sources 
Variable Description 
Per capita net state domestic 
product 
The average Per Capita Net State Domestic Product over 
5 year intervals. The data is in 2000-01 prices.  
Sources: „Domestic product of states of India, 1960-61 to 
2000-01‟, Economic and Political Weekly Research 
Foundation and  Central Statistical Organization. 
Population Growth 
 
  
The growth rate of population over 5 year intervals. 
Sources: Economic Survey (2007-08), 
www.indiabudget.nic.in 
and Census of India, Office of Registrar General. 
Literacy  Rate Literacy rates for 1971 are for the population aged 5 and 
above and for 1981, 1991, 2001, they are for the 
population aged 7 and above.  
Sources: Economic Survey(2007-08),  
www.indiabudget.nic.in 
and Census of India, Office of Registrar General 
State government capital 
expenditure  
Source: Budget documents of the state governments, 
rbi.com 
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Figure 2.1 Mean sector share in NSDP during pe-reform and post-reform period 
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Figure 2.2 Tertiary sector's share in total NSDP for selected states 
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Table 2.6 The effect of per capita NSDP on the share of Primary Sector in total 
NSDP 
Primary Sector OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
Log of PCNSDP -10.95 
(12.37) 
-1.84 
(6.85) 
-11.57 
(11.53) 
Log of Literacy Rate -23.99*** 
(3.86) 
-16.11*** 
(5.96) 
-20.35*** 
(4.17) 
Log of State Capital Expenditure -7.36*** 
(0.94) 
1.57 
(2.01) 
-5.78*** 
(1.09) 
Population Growth 0.05 
(1.66) 
0.99 
(1.16) 
-2.37 
(1.79) 
Initial Income 9.09 
(12.82) 
-0.25 
(6.02) 
9.75 
(11.86) 
Coastal Dummy - - -4.70*** 
(1.34) 
State Effects NO YES NO 
Time Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 112 112 112 
R
2
 .78 .92 .82 
Note: ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
Figures in the parenthesis are robust standard errors.  
 
Table 2.7 The effect of per capita NSDP on the share of Primary Sector in total 
NSDP 
Primary Sector IV 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
Log of PCNSDP -15.87 
(34.99) 
-33.35 
(52.59) 
-18.06 
(33.68) 
Log of Literacy Rate -23.69*** 
(3.71) 
-14.81* 
(8.42) 
-20.15*** 
(3.79) 
Log of State Capital Expenditure -7.37*** 
(1.15) 
2.08 
(3.55) 
-5.8*** 
(1.24) 
Population Growth 0.54 
(1.94) 
-0.39 
(2.30) 
-1.64 
(2.00) 
Initial Income 15.01 
(35.61) 
27.04 
(44.02) 
17.06 
(34.29) 
Coastal Dummy - - -4.10* 
(1.52) 
State Effects NO YES NO 
Time Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 96 96 96 
R
2
 .75 .90 .76 
Note: ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
Figures in the parenthesis are robust standard errors. I have used lag of per capita income 
as an instrument for per capita income variable. 
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Table 2.8 The effect of per capita NSDP on the share of Secondary Sector in total 
NSDP 
Secondary Sector OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
Log of PCNSDP 16.52* 
(8.59) 
16.91*** 
(6.05) 
16.68* 
(8.44) 
Log of Literacy Rate 12.60*** 
(3.27) 
23.96*** 
(4.64) 
11.16** 
(3.28) 
Log of State Capital Expenditure 3.06*** 
(0.80) 
0.22 
(1.64) 
2.64** 
(0.86) 
Population Growth 3.40* 
(1.48) 
1.85 
(1.75) 
4.06* 
(1.86) 
Initial Income -15.29* 
(8.50) 
-8.97* 
(4.98) 
-15.47 
(8.37) 
Coastal Dummy - - 1.27 
(1.09) 
State Effects NO YES NO 
Time Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 112 112 112 
R
2
 .47 .83 .60 
Note: ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
Figures in the parenthesis are robust standard errors.  
 
Table 2.9 The effect of per capita NSDP on the share of Secondary Sector in total 
NSDP 
Secondary Sector IV 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
Log of PCNSDP 7.74 
(27.13) 
36.28 
(31.52) 
8.23 
(27.12) 
Log of Literacy Rate 12.21*** 
(2.88) 
26.09*** 
(5.51) 
11.42*** 
(3.05) 
Log of State Capital Expenditure 2.92*** 
(0.89) 
0.56 
(2.41) 
2.57*** 
(1.00) 
Population Growth 2.95* 
(1.50) 
2.90* 
(1.70) 
3.44 
(1.61) 
Initial Income -6.49 
(27.61) 
-25.22 
(27.08) 
-6.95 
(27.61) 
Coastal Dummy - - 0.92 
(1.22) 
State Effects NO YES NO 
Time Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 96 96 96 
R
2
 .35 .80 .36 
Note: ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
Figures in the parenthesis are robust standard errors. I have used lag of per capita income 
as an instrument for per capita income variable. 
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Table 2.10 The effect of per capita NSDP on the share of Tertiary Sector in total 
NSDP 
Tertiary Sector OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
Log of PCNSDP -5.56 
(8.51) 
-15.07*** 
(6.89) 
-5.11 
(8.21) 
Log of Literacy Rate 11.39*** 
(2.09) 
-7.85* 
(4.20) 
8.74*** 
(2.11) 
Log of State Capital Expenditure 4.29*** 
(0.70) 
-1.80 
(1.56) 
3.14*** 
(0.85) 
Population Growth -3.45* 
(1.39) 
-2.84* 
(1.58) 
-1.68 
(1.32) 
Initial Income 6.20 
(9.02) 
9.22 
(5.95) 
5.72 
(8.54) 
Coastal Dummy - - 3.43** 
(1.06) 
State  Effects NO YES NO 
Time  Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 112 112 112 
R
2
 .81 .92 .84 
Note: ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
Figures in the parenthesis are robust standard errors.  
 
Table 2.11 The effect of per capita NSDP on the share of Tertiary Sector in total 
NSDP 
Tertiary Sector IV 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
Log of PCNSDP 8.13 
(25.70) 
-2.92 
(32.60) 
9.83 
(24.68) 
Log of Literacy Rate 11.48*** 
(2.72) 
-11.28* 
(5.70) 
8.72*** 
(2.78) 
Log of State Capital Expenditure 4.44*** 
(0.85) 
-2.64 
(2.49) 
3.23*** 
(0.9) 
Population Growth -3.49* 
(1.42) 
-2.51 
(1.75) 
-1.79 
(1.47) 
Initial Income -8.52 
(26.16) 
-1.81 
(28.01) 
-10.11 
(25.12) 
Coastal Dummy - - 3.18*** 
(1.11) 
State Effects NO YES NO 
Time Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 96 96 96 
R
2
 .79 .91 .77 
Note: ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
Figures in the parenthesis are robust standard errors. I have used lag of per capita income 
as an instrument for per capita income variable. 
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3 Socio-political violence and economic growth in Indian states. 
3.1 Introduction 
Socio-political conflict can have a lasting impact on the economic development of 
a country. Civil conflicts may have a direct impact on the economy through lost lives and 
loss of physical capital. In addition, through their indirect effect on prospective 
investment, labor supply, production and human and physical capital conflicts can 
impede economic growth. In this paper, I study the impact of socio-political violence in 
India at the sub-national level. 
If we look at Indian socio-political history, since independence (1947) India has 
not had instances of seizure of political power or military coups. India continues to be a 
successful democracy since the time of independence. However, disturbances in terms of 
separatist movements,
41
 ethnic violence and conflicts because of discrimination against 
some castes have been a part of Indian socio-political history.
42
 India is a country with 
diversity: geographic, religious, economic and linguistic. Nevertheless, this diversity 
itself can become a source of socio-political instability and conflict. Guha (2007) 
mentions four types of „axes‟ for conflict in India. First is the caste system which has Jati 
                                                 
41
 There have been a number of separatist movements in India - people in a region 
demanding a separate state for them. Some of the most violent have been, Kashmiri 
separatism: Muslims demanding a separate states of Kashmir; Khalistan: Sikh separatists 
in the Punjab and Haryana regions; Telangana in Andhra Pradesh; and Bodoland in 
Assam. 
42
 Caste structure is a form of social hierarchy in Hindu religion. It was originally only an 
occupational stratification, but over time got translated into social stratification and 
discrimination attached with it. 
 99 
 
and Varna intertwined in it.
43
 There have been numerous instances of violence based on 
either Jati or Varna in Indian society. There has been a constant conflict between the 
higher ranked Jatis and Varnas and the ones that are marked lower in the social 
stratification for their rightful existence and identity. 
The second axis of conflict in India mentioned by Guha (2007) is language. India 
has almost 200 languages and over 1600 dialects that are spoken by various groups. The 
Government of India recognizes 28 official languages.
44
 National unity and linguistic 
diversity may not always be compatible and can give rise to violent conflicts. 
Third, religion has been an important axis of conflict in post-independence India. 
A majority of the Indian population is Hindu. However, there are five other major 
religions that exist in India: Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, Buddhism, and Jainism. India 
has a large population of Muslims in the world second only to Indonesia. Inter-faith 
conflicts, especially Hindu-Muslim conflicts, are a commonplace in India.  
Class is the fourth axis of conflict in India (Guha 2007). Even as India emerges as 
a leader in South Asian countries, it is riddled with extreme social disparity. Income 
inequality is increasing and almost thirty percent of Indians still live in poverty. Thus this 
disparity has led to some conflicts and violence between the „haves‟ and „have nots‟. 
Many oppositions and protests have emanated out of this discrepancy between classes. 
Given the above-mentioned background of socio-political conflict in India, it is 
important to study if this instability has had any effect on Indian economic growth. Such 
a study has important policy implications and can shed light on the link between growth 
                                                 
43
 Jati refers to the endogamous group one is born into (Guha 2007). Varna refers to four 
strata of Hindu social hierarchy. 
44
 Indian currency notes have 15 different languages written on them. 
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and violence in India at the state level. If there is a growth deterring impact of violence, 
then this may help us explain why some states have persistently stayed poor and why 
some states have experienced continued growth.  As discussed above, India is a diverse 
country in many socio-economic aspects. Controlling and handling the conflicts that 
result from such diversity can assure balanced, long term, and stable growth at the sub-
national level in India. 
In this paper I investigate the effect of socio-political violence in 16 Indian states. 
In addition, I also study a sub-sample of seven states that are affected by leftist violence 
in India to analyze the impact of violence on growth in these states. The leftist (Maoist/ 
Naxalite) movement in India is led by revolutionaries who follow a Maoist/Communist 
ideology and who plan to establish a Maoist regime and destroy the legitimacy of the 
Indian government.
45
 The Maoist insurgency and leftist violence have bred instability in 
as many as 228 out of 604 districts in India. The violence related to this movement is one 
of the most important internal security threats that India faces today. 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 3.2, I discuss the theoretical link 
between violence and economic growth and review some empirical studies of the effect 
of sociopolitical violence on economic development. I explain the data and methodology 
in section 3.3. Section 3.4 gives background information on the leftist extremism problem 
in selected states in India. I discuss the results in section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes. 
                                                 
45
 The term „Naxalite‟ comes from the name of the place in West Bengal: „Naxalbari‟, 
where this movement originated. 
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3.2 The relationship between socio-political violence and economic growth 
 Socio-political violence can work as an inhibitor of economic growth and 
development (Alesina 1996; Barro 1991). The forms of violence may differ (for example 
riots, civil wars, coups) but the growth dampening effect of this violence may be 
significant. Civil conflict can cause destruction of humans, natural resources and physical 
capital (Bodea and Eldabawi 2008). Violence can affect economic growth through its 
effect on investment, human capital, economic planning horizons and labor supply. 
Socio-political violence may lead to reduction in investment. Domestic investors 
may not want to invest in their home country, leading to a capital flight and reduction in 
monetary resources. This can affect domestic savings as well. Rodrik (1991) mentions 
that uncertainty of policies can work as a „tax on investment‟, reducing investment and 
affecting economic development. As Goldsmith (1987) mentions, people will be 
encouraged to trade and invest only when they are confident in the future. A possibility of 
political unrest and sudden changes in the economic “rules of the game” will act as 
barriers to investment and growth. Similarly, foreign investors will not want to invest in 
the country. Fearing inefficient and unsecured property rights, much of the foreign direct 
investment will be diverted. Socio-political violence within a country across regions also 
has an impact on the geographic distribution of investments. More stable areas may be 
treated as safer and the troubled states may not be preferred by investors. This would lead 
to lower investment and growth in violence-affected areas, thus perhaps increasing 
inequality across regions, unless richer states had more violence. 
In addition to this direct impact, severe and prolonged violence may also affect 
the security of individuals and nations and thereby shorten planning horizons. For 
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example, an individual may not feel secured in a country because of constant socio- 
political violence and mortality associated with it. This has an effect on his economic 
planning horizon. The fear of an uncertain future can impact individual decisions about 
accumulation of human capital (Bodea and Eldabawi 2008) and savings.   
Socio-political violence can also cause uncertainty in decisions about production 
and labor supply (Alesina 1996). Violent and uncertain surroundings can lead to a direct 
impact on labor supply through the number of deaths and injuries suffered by the people. 
Also indirectly, socio-political violence can induce fear and insecurity in the minds of 
people and thus affect their decisions about participation in economic activities. This may 
give rise to uncertainty in terms of number of people available to work. People may not 
want to stay and work in an area affected by violence. This can lead to a movement of 
people from these states to more peaceful ones. 
In addition, a substantial amount of a state‟s resources may get diverted to 
controlling the conflict and hence development may be affected. For example, in India in 
the states of Jammu and Kashmir where violence prevails because of the border conflict, 
huge amounts of money have to be invested in army maintenance and supplies by the 
Indian and Pakistani governments. Deployment of reserve police and armed forces and 
their up-keep has cost both the governments additional money which could have been 
invested in development of infrastructure and other basic amenities that are lacking in the 
respective areas.  After discussing the theory behind the relationship between socio-
political violence and economic development, in the next section I will present a review 
of some empirical studies that analyze economic growth and violence.  
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There is a wide-ranging empirical literature studying the relationship between 
civil conflict and economic growth.  The association between economic growth and 
political violence can be bi-directional. Lower levels of economic growth and high 
poverty can lead to unrest and civil conflict. As discussed above, it is also possible that 
riots or political violence themselves are detrimental to economic growth. There are 
various empirical studies that examine one or both of the above mentioned hypotheses. 
Below, I will review the major findings of the literature.  
Barro (1991) studies 98 countries over the 1960-1985 period. Barro finds a 
negative relationship between coups and assassinations and economic growth. Similar to 
Barro (1991), Alesina and Perrotti (1996) also find an empirical link between socio-
political violence and lower growth. In a sample of 70 countries from 1960-1985, they 
take into account various indicators of socio-political instability like deaths from political 
violence and assassinations. They find that all types of political instability have a 
negative effect on investment and economic growth.  
Bodea and Eldabawi (2008) study the impact of political violence on economic 
growth in a cross country study covering 68 countries over the period 1970 to 1999. They 
distinguish between three levels of political violence, namely, riots, coups, and civil war. 
Their results show that organized political violence, civil war, and riots in particular have 
a negative effect on the economic development of a country. Especially in the case of 
Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, civil wars were found to be especially detrimental 
to economic development. The risk of civil war accounted for more than 22 percent of the 
income gap between SSA countries and East Asian countries. 
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There is also an extensive literature that investigates the effect of economic 
growth on political instability. Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) study 40 SSA 
countries over the period of 1983 to 1999 to examine the effect of GDP growth on civil 
conflict. Using instrumental variable estimation to control for the endogenous variables, 
the authors find that a negative growth shock of 5 percent points increases the likelihood 
of a civil conflict by fifty percent. This negative impact was no different in SSA countries 
that were richer, more democratic, or more ethnically diverse. 
Urdal (2008) studies political violence in 28 Indian states from 1956 to 2002. The 
author analyzes the effect of population pressure, higher youth populations and 
differential growth rates between ethnic and religious groups on the occurrence of 
political violence. He finds that the scarcity of productive land is linked with higher 
levels of political violence. Higher proportions of young populations also have a 
significant positive impact on sub-national violence in India. Higher young populations 
combined with higher levels of urban inequality are found to be associated with a higher 
number of Hindu-Muslim riots. In addition, the high growth rate of the Hindu population 
relative to the Muslim population has a positive impact on Hindu-Muslim riots. 
In another study of India, Krishna (2008) investigates the determinants of civil 
conflict in seven north-eastern states for the period 1970-2007. He finds that both relative 
and absolute poverty in these states are important determinants of civil conflict. Also, 
economic and political discrimination increase the probability of civil conflict. More 
populous states seem to have a higher risk of an outbreak of conflict.  
Bohlken and Sergenti (2009) examine the effect of economic growth on Hindu-
Muslim riots for fifteen states in India for the period 1982-1995. To deal with the 
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endogeneity issue of the growth variable, the authors use rainfall as an instrument. They 
find that the relationship between growth and riots is negative and significant. Their 
estimates show that a one percent increase in the growth rate of the GDP is associated 
with a decrease in average number of riots by five percent. The authors also show that the 
occurrence of riots in the past year increases the possibility of violence in the future. The 
incidence of violence (riots) in the adjacent states has a spillover effect on riots.    
My paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, I study the effect of riots 
on economic growth in states in India. In the current political violence and growth 
literature on India, none of the papers study the effect of riots on economic growth. The 
determinants of riots are widely discussed but riots as a determinant of economic 
development is not studied in the literature in an Indian context. The above-mentioned 
papers like Bodea and Eldabawi investigate the effect of riots in other countries. 
However, a study of the effect of political violence at the state level in India has not been 
undertaken. My paper fills this gap. Second, I take into consideration a subset of the 
states that are affected by leftist extremism and study the effect of riots in those states 
affected by Maoist violence.  
After reviewing some important empirical papers in the literature on violence and 
growth, in the following section I discuss the data and methodology used to study the 
effect of socio-political violence in Indian states. 
3.3 Data and methodology 
My sample covers the period 1970 to 2005 and includes data from 16 Indian 
states: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, 
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Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu, Uttar 
Pradesh, and West Bengal. 
To investigate the effect of socio-political violence on growth, I use as my 
dependent variable the average annual growth rate of the Net State Domestic Product 
(NSDP). I use the number of riots in a state in a given time period as an indicator of 
socio-political violence. There are many different indicators of political instability and 
violence used in the literature. For example, Bohlken and Sergenti (2009) use the number 
of Hindu Muslim riots in India as an indicator of violence. Besley and Persson (2009) use 
the incidence of internal and external wars to indicate violence. Some papers use 
assassinations and coups to measure socio-political violence (Barro 1991; Londregan and 
Poole 1990).  Blanco and Grier (2009) build an index of political instability based on nine 
different indicators like coups, riots, assassinations and strikes.   
As far as Indian data is concerned, the only variable that reflects socio-political 
violence and is available for a range of states over a long period is the number of riots. 
Therefore I choose the same for my purposes. I use the „Crime in India‟ dataset compiled 
by Marshall and Marshall (2005). Riots are categorized as violent crimes affecting public 
safety, according to the Indian Penal Code by the National Crime Records Bureau of 
India. A riot is defined as a „single incident involving five or more persons‟. As 
mentioned in „Crime in India, 2005‟, violent crimes such as riots affect the lives and 
safety of people.  Riots can induce insecurity and fear in the minds of people and are also 
a threat to public peace. As discussed earlier in the paper, socio-political violence is 
expected to be negatively related to economic growth and development.  In the sample, 
Bihar has the highest number of riots reported, followed by Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. 
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Figure 3.1 gives the average number of riots in 16 states in India. I use the average 
number of riots over a five-year period in a state as an indicator of socio-political 
violence. 
While estimating the effect of riots on economic growth across states, there is an 
important problem of reverse causality that needs to be taken into account. As mentioned 
earlier, it is possible that riots affect growth; nevertheless, it may also be the case that 
lower economic growth causes riots. There are various papers that discuss slower 
economic growth as a possible determinant of socio-political violence (Gurr 1970; Olzak 
1992; Bohlken and Sergenti 2009; Krishna 2008). These papers explain how poor 
economic development can increase the risk and events of violence in a society. This 
makes riots potentially endogenous in the regression.
46
 To account for the feedback effect 
between riots and economic growth, I estimate the model using instrumental variables. I 
use area under forest cover as an instrumental variable for number of riots. Krishna 
(2008) and Economist, (2010) mention forest area as a determinant of political violence. 
The presence of forest cover may act as a favorable condition for the perpetrators 
(Krishna 2008; Economist 2010). In addition to the number of riots, I use other 
independent variables such as population growth, literacy rate, capital expenditure by the 
state government, and a coastal dummy.  I discuss the control variables below. Table 3.1 
gives details about the data and their sources.  
i) Literacy Rate:  
                                                 
46
 I tested for endogeneity using the Hausman test. The results of the test did not suggest 
the use of IV estimation. I go ahead using the instrumental variable approach because of 
the strong theoretical underpinnings that suggest a reverse causality between socio-
political violence and economic growth. 
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The literacy rate is an indicator of human capital and a possible determinant of 
economic development. Literacy can increase the efficiency of economic and political 
institutions and helps bring about scientific advances (Schultz 1991). Theoretically, I 
would expect to see a positive relationship between literacy and economic growth.  
However, in the literature we find mixed evidence of the effect of education or literacy on 
economic growth. Some papers like Barro (1991) and Aghion, Boustan, Hoxby and 
Vandenbussche (2009), find that education has a positive effect on economic growth 
whereas Pritchett (2004) fails to find a strong positive effect of education on economic 
development.  
ii) Population Growth: 
There is no consensus in the literature on the effect on population growth on 
economic development. There are three schools of thought, namely the pessimists, the 
optimists, and the revisionists (Birdsall 1991). The pessimists, like Malthus (1806), 
Solow (1956), Coale and Hoover (1958), argue that faster population growth and the 
corresponding increase in labor supply relative to capital formation would lower per 
capita consumption levels. On the other hand, optimists look at population as a „net 
contributor‟ to economic growth (Birdsall 1991). Increased population can bring about 
scale economies and encourage technological innovations. (Boserup 1965, 1981; Kuznets 
1966). Revisionists do not agree with any generalization about the consequences of 
population growth and focus on micro-level case studies which may vary by time, place, 
and circumstances (Birdsall 1991). 
 iii) Investment: 
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 One would expect that higher investment would promote economic growth 
(Mankiw 2000). Getting a long and reliable time series data on investment across states is 
not possible for India. Hence one has to look for proxies for public investment levels. 
Some papers in the literature use various proxies like developmental expenditures by 
state (Ahluwalia 2000) and capital expenditures by state (Adabar 2000; Nayyar 2008). 
Nayyar (2008) finds that at the national level there is a strong correlation between state-
wise capital expenditure and gross capital formation in the public sector for the period 
1975-2003. Following Nayyar (2008) and Adabar (2000), I use capital expenditure by the 
states in India as a measure of public investment expenditure at the state level. I expect 
state capital expenditure to have a positive impact on the growth of NSDP. 
iv) Coastal Dummy: 
I create a dummy variable which equals 1 if the state is a coastal state and 0 
otherwise.  There is a link between economic growth and access to the sea (Sachs 2001). 
The states that are coastal can have easy access to the ocean and therefore may benefit 
more easily from ocean trade as compared to the landlocked states. Thus we would 
expect to see a positive relationship between economic growth and coastal dummy.  
v) Initial Income:  
Countries with a lower initial income grow faster owing to diminishing returns to 
scale (Solow 1956). A rich country will grow slower as diminishing marginal returns to 
capital set in as it accumulates more and more capital. On the other hand, a poor country, 
where capital is scarce, will have a higher return to capital and grow faster. For this 
variable, for each five year period I use income from the previous year as the initial 
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income. For example for five year period 1970-74 I use income in 1969 as the initial 
income and so on.  
vi)  Naxalite Dummy: 
I also want to test if there is any effect of socio-political violence in the states that are 
affected by Maoist insurgency and violence. For this, I include an interaction term in the 
regression. Some states like Bihar that face a problem of leftist violence also have a high 
number of riots. First, I create a Naxal state dummy variable equal to 1 if the state is 
affected by Naxalite insurgency and 0 otherwise. In India there are seven states that are 
troubled by leftist extremism /Naxalite violence: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal.
47
 The severely affected 
districts in these states are sometimes referred to as the „red corridor‟ or „the compact 
revolutionary zone‟ (CRZ). I interact this Naxal state dummy variable with the riots 
variable in the regression to determine if the effect of riots on growth is different in these 
states.  
Table 3.2 gives the summary statistics of the data. I explain the problem of leftist 
violence in India in the next section. 
3.4 Violence and economic growth in the states affected by leftist extremist 
violence in India 
The origin of Naxal/Maoist movement can be traced back to a peasant uprising in 
West Bengal in 1967 in a village by the name of Naxalbari. This movement, led by 
                                                 
47
 The most severely affected districts are in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal. In 
2001, two new states were carved out of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh: Jharkhand and 
Chattisgarh. For data consistency purposes I have included Chhattisgarh in Madhya 
Pradesh and Jharkhand in Bihar for my sample period. 
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revolutionaries who followed Maoist/Communist ideology, was launched under the name 
of the Communist Party of India (CPI). However, in April of 1969, a split occurred in the 
party and the radical platform was adopted by a group calling themselves the Communist 
Party of India (Marxist-Leninist). The CPI continued to put forth their demands through 
constitutional means but this new faction CPI (ML) adopted violent ways. Their objective 
of the movement is the seizure of power through an agrarian revolution (CII, 2010). After 
the revolution, they plan to establish a „Maoist State‟ or a communist regime.  
Since its founding, however, this movement has become more and more violent. 
In 2009, 228 out of the total 604 districts in India were affected by leftist violence. In 
2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called Maoist extremism the most serious 
internal threat to national security. In the last decade (2001-2010) the total number of 
deaths from leftist violence was close to 6,000 (Ministry of Home Affairs, India).  
The Naxalites‟s strategy is to destroy the state‟s legitimacy (CII 2010). They try 
to gain acceptance among people and finally aim to capture political power through 
violent means. Their main activities to accomplish these goals include attacks on police 
force, destruction of the state‟s property, extensive use of landmines and other weapons, 
disruption of railroads, and disruption of employment generation projects of the State. To 
carry out such activities that finally impede development of these areas, the leftist groups 
mobilize local people and instigate the people against the state. The Naxals have also 
established what they call „Jan Adalats‟, which is their own judicial system used to 
dispense quick justice. These deal with a wide range of disputes ranging from family 
matters to land disputes. The left-extremists have terrorized people through such Jan-
Adalats, and their so-called judgment. Violation of Jan Adalat verdicts have also led to 
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mass killings of innocent people. Some areas are sealed by the Naxalites to make sure 
that government help does not reach the afflicted people. 
Figure 3.2 presents the number of violent Naxalite incidences and the related 
number of deaths. As can be seen, Jharkhand (Bihar) and Chattisgarh (Madhya Pradesh) 
are the worst affected areas. It also appears that the states that are the most affected are 
also the ones with the lowest levels of socio-economic development. For instance, in 
terms of net state domestic product, states such as Bihar and Orissa have shown slow 
growth since 1970. Also, in these states the foreign direct investment as a percentage of 
NSDP is negligible and the development of the service sector has been limited. 
Demographic variables like fertility rates and infant mortality rates also indicate low 
levels of development. 
48
 
3.5 Results 
Table 3.3 provides the results of regressing state income growth on the above 
mentioned variables using OLS estimation. Table 3.4 gives the results when I use 
instrumental variables to account for possible endogeneity. In each of these two tables, 
there are six columns, each with a different specification. In column 1 and 2, I have 
included time effects in addition to the other independent variables. In column 3 and 4, I 
have taken into account time as well as state fixed effects, which helps to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity across the states in the sample. In column 5 and 6, I include a 
                                                 
48
 Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if 
she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with 
current age-specific fertility rates (www.worldbank.org). Infant Mortality rate refers to 
the probability (expressed as a rate per 1,000 live births) of a child born in a specified 
year dying before reaching the age of one if subject to current age-specific mortality rates 
(www.worldbank.org).  
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dummy variable indicating whether the state in question is coastal or not. I do not use the 
state fixed effects in this specification because the coastal dummy variable is time-
invariant and the use of state dummies and the coastal dummy causes a collinearity 
problem.   
The coefficient on initial income in both column 1 and 5 in Table 3.3 is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Thus there does not seem to be evidence of 
conditional convergence. The states that started out richer than others grew faster than 
poorer states. However, the introduction of state effects makes the coefficient on initial 
income insignificantly different from 0. Population growth has a negative and significant 
impact on economic growth in all of the specifications. The coefficient on population 
growth is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level in column 1 and 2 
in Table 3.3. This significance level falls to five percent in columns 3, 4, 5, and 6 but the 
negative coefficient still remains significant. This finding corroborates other similar 
results in the literature about negative effect of population growth. Particularly, Nayyar 
(2008) and Adabar (2004) find a growth-retarding effect of population growth in case of 
India.   
Column 1, 2, 5, and 6 of Table 3.3 show that riots have no statistically significant 
effect on the growth of NSDP. However when I take state fixed effects into account in 
column 3 and 4, riots have a positive and significant effect on growth rate of NSDP.  This 
is unexpected given the extensive literature about the growth-deterrent effects of socio-
political violence. Initial income has a positive and significant effect on NSDP growth. 
Next, in column 4, the interaction term of riots and Naxalite states has a negative effect. 
This means that in case of states that affected by Naxalite/Maoist violence, riots have a 
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negative effect on the growth of NSDP. The coefficient on the interaction term is 
statistically significant at the five percent level. However, as seen from columns 2 and 6, 
the negative effect of the interaction variable goes away in other specifications of the 
model.  
Table 3.4 presents the results for estimation using instrumental variables (IV). As 
mentioned earlier in the paper, the OLS estimates may be biased because of endogeneity 
of the riots variable.  
In the case of population growth, similar to OLS results, I find a negative 
relationship between population growth and economic growth. However, the negative 
effect is statistically significant only in columns 1, 2, and 5. Initial income has a negative 
impact on economic growth in IV estimation in column 4. The coefficient on initial 
income in column 4 of Table 3.4 is negative and statistically significant at 1 percent level. 
The states that were poorer have indeed grown faster. This is in contrast to the positive 
effect found in case of OLS.  
Column 1, 2, 5, and 6 of Table 3.4 show that riots have no statistically significant 
effect on the growth of NSDP. This is similar to the results obtained while using OLS. 
One important difference is that now riots are insignificant even in case of column 3 and 
4. As mentioned earlier, OLS showed that riots have a positive effect on economic 
growth: which seemed counterintuitive. However, now after using IV and correcting for 
the endogeneity bias, the positive effect is eliminated. The interaction variable between 
Naxalite dummy and riots has a negative effect on economic growth. The coefficient on 
the interaction term in column 2 and 6 is negative and statistically significant at the five 
percent level. Thus, the IV results demonstrate the growth inhibiting effect of riots in the 
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states mired by leftist extremism. This result is similar to the negative relationship 
between socio-political violence and economic growth found in earlier papers like 
Alesina and Perotti (1996), Barro (1991) and Bodea and Eldabawi (2008).  
To summarize the most important results, I find a negative effect of riots on 
economic growth in the states affected by Naxalite violence but not in other states. Also, 
there is an adverse impact of population on growth of NSDP.  
3.6 Conclusion 
 India in the past decade has emerged as one of the fastest growing countries in 
South Asia. In terms of India‟s stability and long term growth it is important to study the 
effect of socio-political violence. I study the effect of riots on economic growth in 16 
Indian states and find that in India at large riots do not have a significant effect on NSDP 
growth. In spite of the various socio-political disturbances in terms of caste, language and 
ethnic issues, India has continued to develop economically. The episodes of socio-
political problems and related violence do not seem to have put a drag on India‟s fast 
pace of economic growth. However, I find that in case of seven states that are affected 
with Maoist/Naxalite violence, riots have a significant growth-inhibiting effect. 
Population growth has a significant negative impact on the growth of NSDP.   
Exploring the effect of riots on location of foreign direct investments could be an 
interesting topic for future research. In addition to this, exploring the link between 
continued socio-political violence and the displacement of affected people and related 
migration may also be of interest for further study. Riots and other forms of socio-
political violence cannot be ignored because they fail to have a direct measurable impact 
on economic development of a state or country. These disturbances in themselves pose a 
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threat to the security of the entire society and can threaten the foundations of democratic 
institutions and therefore should be taken seriously.  
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Table 3.1 Explanation of the variables and their sources 
Variable Description 
Growth rate of per capita net 
state domestic product 
The average growth rate of Per Capita Net State Domestic 
Product over 5 year intervals. The data is in 2000-01 
prices.  
Sources: „Domestic product of states of India, 1960-61 to 
2000-01‟, Economic and Political Weekly Research 
Foundation and Central Statistical Organization. 
Population Growth 
 
  
The growth rate of population over 5 year intervals. 
Sources: Economic Survey (2007-08), 
www.indiabudget.nic.in 
and Census of India, Office of Registrar General. 
Literacy  Literacy rates for 1971 are for the population aged 5 and 
above and for 1981, 1991, 2001, they are for the 
population aged 7 and above.  
Sources: Economic Survey(2007-08),  
www.indiabudget.nic.in 
and Census of India, Office of Registrar General 
Seaside dummy 
 
Equal to one if the state has sea access, zero otherwise  
Source: Author‟s calculation 
Riots Source: „Crime in India‟ compiled by Monty G. Marshall 
and Donna R. Marshall, Center for systemic peace, 2008 
State government capital 
expenditure  
Source: Budget documents of the state governments, 
rbi.com 
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Table 3.2 Summary statistics 
Variable Name No. of Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Average annual growth rate of per capita 
NSDP 112 2.03 2.55 -5.54 8.58 
Initial Per capita NSDP 112 9.15 0.43 8.43 10.08 
Log of Literacy rate 112 3.86 0.33 3.11 4.50 
Log of State Capital expenditure 112 7.72 0.56 5.80 9.12 
Population Growth 112 1.91 0.50 0.06 3.05 
Log of Riots 112 7.88 1.68 1.33 9.91 
Coastal Dummy 112 0.5 0.5 0 1 
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Figure 3.1Average number of riots in selected states in India during 1970-2005 
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Figure 3.2 Number of Leftist violence incidents and related deaths in selected states 
(2004-2008) 
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Table 3.3 Estimating the effect of riots on economic growth in Indian states using OLS 
Average Annual Growth Rate  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Population Growth -1.44
***
 
(0.48) 
-1.45
***
 
(0.48) 
-1.74
**
 
(0.83) 
-1.52
**
 
(0.8) 
-1.39
** 
(0.58) 
-1.33
**
 
(0.58) 
Log of Literacy Rate 0.22 
(0.85) 
0.06 
(0.87) 
-1.30 
(2.03) 
-1.61 
(1.93) 
0.17 
(0.87) 
-0.08 
(0.88) 
Log of State Capital Expenditure 0.26 
(0.34) 
0.50 
(0.40) 
1.1 
(1.10) 
0.58 
(1.07) 
0.25 
(0.33) 
0.49 
(0.39) 
Initial Income 1.37
*
 
(0.78) 
1.09 
(0.81) 
-2.06 
(2.09) 
-1.46 
(2.06) 
1.33 
(0.81) 
0.96 
(0.86) 
Log of Riots 0.09 
(0.11) 
0.08 
(0.11) 
0.52
*
 
(0.29) 
0.91
*
 
(0.37) 
0.08 
(0.13) 
0.06 
(0.13) 
Naxalite dummy*Log of riots  - -0.06 
(0.04) 
- -2.30
***
 
(0.80) 
- -0.06 
(0.05) 
Coastal Dummy - - - - 0.09 
(0.48) 
0.24 
(0.50) 
State Effects NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 112 
R
2
 0.58 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.58 0.59 
Note: ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. Figures in the parenthesis are robust standard 
errors.  
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Table 3.4 Estimating the effect of riots on economic growth in Indian states using IV 
Average Annual Growth Rate  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
Population Growth -1.41
***
 
(0.48) 
-1.21
***
 
(0.48) 
-1.31 
(0.94) 
-0.69 
(0.94) 
-1.48
** 
(0.59) 
-0.82 
(0.61) 
Log of Literacy Rate 0.12 
(1.35) 
1.00 
(1.53) 
-2.49 
(2.96) 
-0.35 
(3.20) 
-0.13 
(1.30) 
0.83 
(1.44) 
Log of State Capital Expenditure 0.005 
(0.79) 
0.70 
(0.84) 
1.05 
(0.99) 
1.02 
(1.26) 
-0.02 
(0.94) 
0.84 
(0.93) 
Initial Income 1.98 
(1.84) 
0.59 
(1.84) 
-3.21 
(2.24) 
-6.81 
(2.56) 
2.17 
(2.73) 
-0.27 
(2.49) 
Log of Riots 0.26 
(0.48) 
0.10 
(0.46) 
1.66 
(1.64) 
2.87 
(1.82) 
0.31 
(0.74) 
-0.11 
(0.63) 
Naxalite dummy*Log of riots - -0.11
**
 
(0.05) 
- 0.77 
(2.14) 
- -0.13
** 
(0.06 
Coastal Dummy - - - - -0.13 
(0.84) 
0.78 
(0.82) 
State Effects NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 112 96 112 96 112 96 
R
2
 0.58 0.47 0.59 0.41 0.57 0.49 
First Stage Results: Dependent variable log of riots 
Log of Forest Area F-stat 9.23  5.02  4.23  
Note: ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. Figures in the parenthesis are robust standard 
errors. I have used area of forest cover in a state as an instrument for riots. I have used lag of riots in states affected by Naxalite 
violence as instrument for riots in states affected by Naxalite violence. 
